Modeling Urbanization and Economic Growth by Kelley, A.C. & Williamson, J.G.
Modeling Urbanization and 
Economic Growth
Kelley, A.C. and Williamson, J.G.
 
IIASA Research Report
May 1980
Kelley, A.C. and Williamson, J.G. (1980) Modeling Urbanization and Economic Growth. IIASA Research Report. 
Copyright © May 1980 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/1245/ All rights reserved. Permission to make 
digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided 
that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage. All copies must bear this notice and 
the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, 
permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
MODELING URBANIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
A.C. Kelley 
J.G. Williamson 
RR-80-22 
May 1980 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Laxenburg, Austria 

FOREWORD 
Roughly 1.6 billion people, 40 percent of the world's population, live in urban 
areas today. At the beginning of the last century, the urban population of the 
world totaled only 25 million. According to  recent United Nations estimates, 
about 3.1 billion people, twice today's urban population, will be living in urban 
areas by the year 2000. 
Scholars and policy makers often disagree when it comes to  evaluating the 
desirability of current rapid rates of urban growth in many parts of the globe. 
Some see this trend as fostering national processes of socioeconomic develop- 
ment, particularly in the poorer and rapidly urbanizing countries of the Third 
World; whereas others believe the consequences to  be largely undesirable and 
argue that such urban growth should be slowed down. 
As part of a search for convincing evidence for or against rapid rates of 
urban growth in developing countries, the Human Settlements and Services 
Area initiated in 1977 a research project t o  study the process of structural 
transformation in nations evolving from primarily rural-agrarian t o  urban- 
industrial societies. Data from several countries selected as case studies are 
being collected, and the research is focusing on spatial population growth and 
economic development, and on their resource and service demands. 
This report describes a prototype model of the urbanization and 
development process. It sets out a general equilibrium perspective that illumi- 
nates several fundamental aspects of the process of demoeconomic structural 
change and synthesizes the growing recent literature on general equilibrium 
modeling of dualistic development. When subjected t o  empirical analysis it 
should be capable of describing the past and of assessing alternative future 
consequences of rapid urbanization and growth. 
A list of papers in the Population, Resources, and Growth Series appears 
at  the end of this report. 
Andrei Rogers 
Chairman 
Human Settlements 
and Services Area 
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1 THE PROBLEM 
1 . I  Introduction 
The past quarter of a century has witnessed unprecedented economic progress 
in the Third World as gauged by the standards of history since the Industrial 
Revolution. Yet major problems have arisen, some of which are the con- 
sequence of the progress itself and may become serious constraints on future 
development. City growth is one such problem. By the end of this century the 
United Nations (UN) forecasts (1976: 22-44, 77-83): 
1. Urban population growth rates three times those of rural areas; 
2. Two billion people, exceeding 40percent of the Third World popu- 
lation, living in cities; 
3. Some cities reaching extremely large sizes: Mexico City (3 1.6 million); 
S i o  Paulo (26.0 million); and Cairo, Jakarta, Seoul, and Karachi each 
exceeding 15 million. 
Analysts and policy makers are sharply divided on the validity and 
consequences of these forecasts. Pessimists stress the developing countries' 
inability to cope with the resource and social systems requirements of rapid 
urban growth and high urban densities, thus prompting the term "over- 
urbanization." Optimists view urban growth as the key device for raising 
average living standards and labor productivity. The optimists also view urban- 
ization as a natural outcome of economic development, and a necessary 
requirement for the more rational use of economic resources. Debate over 
public policy options regarding Third World urban growth remains intense. 
A second and related problem which is often cited as constraining 
economic progress is the "population explosion." From 1950 to  1979 Third 
World populations (excluding China) increased from 1.8 billion to 3.3 billion; 
by the end of the twentieth century the tally is estimated t o  read 5.1 billion. 
This exceptional pace of population growth has resulted in enormous resource 
demands, especially given the low labor productivities and high dependency 
rates found in these countries. Economists and demographers cannot agree on 
the quantitative effects of these trends on  economic development, although 
the general assessment ranges from extreme pessimism t o  mild concern. (Com- 
pare, for example, Coale and Hoover, 1958 and Enke, 1971 with Kuznets, 
1960, 1967 and Adelman and Robinson, 1978.) 
T o  assess the nature of urban growth and demographic change, and their 
significance for economic development, it is necessary t o  specify a theoretical 
framework which, when subjected t o  empirical analysis, is capable of describing 
the past, assessing the future, and displaying relevant policy options. This 
report presents the elements of one such economic model. Four criteria have 
guided our selection of specifications. 
First, we have attemped t o  develop a framework that is as analytically 
rich as possible. At the same time we have suppressed regional, sectoral, and 
household detail. While such detail might appear t o  add "realism," in our 
judgment it would add little analytical insight.* 
Second, we have specified the model so as t o  be empirically implementable. 
At every stage in model formulation, extensive use has been made of infor- 
mation assembled by the World Bank, the United Nations, national govern- 
ments, and of the results of numerous econometric studies of developing 
countries. 
Third, the model has been designed to  analyze a low-income growing 
economy which falls within the small-country category. The latter refers less 
t o  size of land area, population or  economic market, and more to  the assump- 
tion that the country is a price taker in world markets. The country must not 
be so  important in export markets that it can materially influence world prices. 
Given this assumption, countries with primary product exports which are 
important in their domestic economy, and which constitute a notable share of 
world consumption (e.g., oil, copper, tin), may not be well explained by our 
model. 
Finally, the model has been developed t o  offer additional insight into the 
standard questions in development economics: the sources of growth and 
structural change, the determinants of physical and human capital accumu- 
lation, the impact of growth on the distribution of income, the role of 
technological progress, and so forth. The model has also been developed t o  
offer insight into questions which are less conventional: the role of energy 
imports, the determinants of land use, the explanation for the rise in urban 
land prices, the impact of housing market behavior, the role of spatially 
* For a framework possessing considerable detail, the most ambitious effort in a general equilibrium 
modeling is by Irma Adelman and Sherman Robinson. Their Korean model contains over 3,000 endo- 
genous variables; the requirements for parameterization were extensive (Adelman and Robinson, 1978). 
nontradeable services on migration, and others. Moreover, the framework has 
been specified with an eye toward performing policy "counterfactuals"and, as a 
result, numerous government policy parameters have been included in the model. 
1.2 An Overview o f  the Model 
The model possesses a high degree of closure in its general equilibrium 
properties. Most input and output prices are determined endogenously, and 
thus interactions of supply and demand are critical to  resource allocation. 
Neoclassical production functions are assumed, and price-responsive demand 
relationships within an integrated household demand system are highlighted. 
A period-by-period equilibrium is sought where factors move between and 
within sectors minimizing the rate of return and earnings differentials, subject 
to  various constraints. Optimization at  the micro-economic level is imposed on 
firms and households who, within a Walrasian tatonnement process, indepen- 
dently maximize their returns and utilities, thereby implying an efficient 
allocation of economic resources. 
I t  should already be apparent that the model descends from a robust 
family tree: small scale general equilibrium models of dualistic development, 
large scale computable general equilibrium models, multisectoral models 
stressing interindustry linkages in the Leontief tradition, and even macro- 
economic-demographic models of limited closure which highlight population 
and government policy options.* Given this large and expanding literature. 
it might prove useful to  stress the novelties in our own approach. 
We distinguish between tradeables and nontradeables, the latter including 
various location-specific services. This is hardly the first multisectoral model 
to recognize nontradeables but it is the first spatial dualistic model which 
simultaneously stresses the importance of nontradeables as an influence on 
migration behavior. The presence of nontradeables results in urban-rural 
cost-of-living differentials. Since migrants are assumed to move in response to  
improvements in expected earnings adjusted for cost-of-living differentials, the 
latter may exert an important impact on  the rate of urban growth. For 
example, rapid urban growth will increase the relative scarcity of housing (and 
support services) - both dye to  the short-run rise in structure rents and to 
the long-run rise in land rents. As a result, the city will be somewhat less 
appealing to potential migrants. Furthermore, new house building (and social 
* Early dualistic models include those of W. A. Lewis (1954), J. C. Fei and G. Ranis (1961, 1964), 
D. W. Jorgenson (1961, 1967), and P. Zarembka (1972). A review and extension of these and other 
models can be found in A. C. Kelley, J. G. Williamson, and R. J. Cheetham (1972:7-17, 53-57), and 
C. Lluch (1974). The earliest general equilibrium multisectoral framework revealing interindustry linkages 
is by L. Johansen (1 959). Recent applications include I. Adelman and S. Robinson (1978) and L. Bergman 
(1978). Macr@economic-demog~aphic models of limited closure originated with the work of A. Coale 
and E. Hoover (1958). Later contributions include R. Barlow (1967), R. Badow and G. Davis (1974), 
F. Denton and B. Spencer (1976), S. Enke (1971), Bachue-Phillipines by G. Rodgers, M. Hopkins, and 
R. Wery (1978). and J. Simon (1976). 
overhead) serves to diminish the rate of "productive" capital accumulation in 
the city and thus diminishes the rate of growth of job vacancies in the modern 
urban sector. reducing the attraction of the city still further. Urban growth, 
therefore, has embedded in it countervailing forces which may produce 
retardation over time, a characterization consistent with the stylized facts of 
history. 
Development economists have long emphasized the importance of human 
capital accumulatiotl during the process of growth (Schultz 196 1, 1972), but 
it has appeared infrequently in formal models; the emphasis almost always has 
been on conventional physical capital. A somewhat broader view of accumu- 
lation is taken in the present model. The modern urban sectors are specified to  
utilize skilled labor and these skills are assumed to be complementary with 
physical capital. Imperfect capital markets exclude individual investment in 
human capital, but firms invest in skills accumulation through training pro- 
grams. This investment decision is made by comparing the discounted flow of 
augmented profits to  the current training cost, namely the average return t o  
investment in physical plant and equipment. The accumulation of human 
capital is thus determined by its return to  the using firms as well as by the 
demographic trends influencing the stock of "potential trainables," and this 
stock is determined jointly by demography aiid government policy toward 
formal education. In contrast t o  the Coale and Hoover (1958) tradition, 
demographically-induced expenditures on education are not considered unpro- 
ductive consumption financed at the expense of productive investment. Our 
treatment may well alter assessments of the effect of population growth on the 
pace of economic growth. 
While growth and development theory has made significant strides in 
introducing labor heterogeneity into its paradigms, a symmetric treatment of 
capital is less common. Of course capital has multisector uses, and frequently 
capital is treated as "putty-clay" so that once in place there are in effect many 
types of physical capital stocks. But this mainly represents a migration specifi- 
cation. Our model explicitly confronts a portfolio of  heterogeneous capital 
stocks consisting of "productive" conventional capital (plant and equipment), 
"unproductive" capital in residential structures (housing), and human capital 
(training and skills accumulation). All are financed out of a common savings 
pool and, subject to the constraints o f  capital market fragmentation, new 
investment is allocated according to its greatest return. Elements of a port- 
folio choice are, therefore, confronted even in a simple model without 
financial assets. Moreover, the economy's critical allocation of saving between 
"productive" and "unproductive" uses obeys traditional neoclassical rules, 
except that the institutional realities of the undeveloped Third World capital 
market constrain that allocation. These constraints include: 
- the absence of a mortgage market so that all housing must be self- 
financed 
the  absence of a household loan market so  that individual investment 
in human capital is suppressed 
demographic restrictions on the stock of "potential trainables" thus 
inhibiting firms' investment in human capital and making it possible 
for the  rate of return t o  human capital t o  remain at  high levels 
the immobility of physical capital once in place, making it possible 
for rate of return differentials across sectors t o  persist over long 
periods of time 
These "capital-market imperfections" provide abundant options for government 
policy t o  eliminate inefficient resource allocations and "market failures" 
induced primarily by the disequilibrating impact of successful growth. Our 
model allows us t o  decompose the  sources of those market failures as well as 
t o  evaluate the benefits from government intervention. 
Typically, development models incorporate very simple specifications for 
land use, constraining it t o  agricultural production and specifying its growth as 
exogenous. This treatment is appropriate for many purposes, but  it is unaccept- 
able in a model where a focus is urban growth and urban problems. In our 
model optimal land use is explicitly confronted. Although we d o  not employ 
the urban economist's land-gradient function, we are still able t o  formulate an 
explanation of  the rate of urban encroachment on farmland at  the city's 
margin. This urban land-use specification has potentially important impli- 
cations. Urban growth will bid up the price of urban land largely due  t o  the 
requirements for residential structures and social overhead. Because land is 
immobile, it partakes of the same characteristics as nontradeables. Thus, 
endogenously determined land use and rents can notably influence sectoral 
cost-of-living differences with a resulting impact on rural-urban migration and 
city growth. In addition, the model is equipped t o  deal with two additional 
urban problems: first, the tension between rising urban population densities, 
on  the  one hand, and "suburbanization," on the other;  and second. the 
dramatic rise in urban land values widely observed in the Third World. 
Government activities are typically specified as exogenous in formal 
models of  development. However, given the accumulating evidence that  
government spending exhibits broadly systematic patterns, which are related 
t o  growth and structural change. it seems appropriate t o  move toward a specifi- 
cation of  endogenous government fiscal behavior (Heller, 1975). In  our  model, 
government spending is constrained by the availability of public income, 
stemming from endogenous tax revenues and exogenously determined inter- 
national capital flows. The latter is specified in a manner which places us in 
the  "revisionist" foreign-aid camp since foreign capital does not augment the 
domestic savings pool dollar for dollar. Furthermore, the government allocates 
its capital budget t o  maximize returns while the current account is determined 
in response t o  social preferences. In addition. spending has an "urban bias." 
The  government's domestic revenue sources are numerous, thus providing an 
opportunity t o  assess the effects of alternative government taxation policies on 
structural change, the commodity price structure, growth, and distribution. 
While the above specifications can be considered the most novel features 
of our economic model, it should also be emphasized that our framework 
attempts a synthesis from the growing literature on general equilibrium 
systems.* Many of our model specifications can be found elsewhere. To our 
knowledge, however, these specifications have yet to  be combined in a single 
model capable of confronting many of the key macro-development issues of 
the 1980s. For example, nested constant elasticity o f  substitution production 
functions have been employed by Bergman (1978) and Edmonston, Sanderson, 
and Sapoznikow (1976), but the former incorporates only a limited role for 
demand, while the latter is not designed t o  confront urbanization or policy 
issues. Labor market fragmentation and wage gaps have been highlighted by 
Yap (1972, 1976a), but endogenous demand forces are suppressed in her 
model. Similar observations may be made for the treatment of imported energy 
requirements, the use of the extended linear expenditure system, and the 
specification of a migrants' remittances function. The time is ripe to exploit 
the theoretical advances in general equilibrium modeling. 
All of these remarks are directed toward the economic model discussed in 
Chapter 2. We have said nothing about the demography with which the 
economic model interacts. The demographic model, yet to  be specified,? 
will be detailed, involving urban and rural age- sexspecific schedules of 
mortality, fertility, and migration. The demographic model determines urban 
and rural labor force supplies; the economic framework determines labor force 
needs as well as the equilibrating mechanism for matching needs with supplies 
from period to  period. Demography enters directly by its influence on the level 
of demand and its composition (especially through housing requirements), by 
determining labor force growth (fixed age-sex--location labor force partici- 
pation rates are assumed), by its impact on regional settlement patterns and 
land use, and by modifying the distribution and availability of new investment 
o r  capital formation through the urban-rural remittance mechanism. Popu- 
lation growth rates are determined exogenously given the constancy of the 
various demographic schedules, although aggregate population growth can 
change due to  intersectoral migration. 
A final distinguishing feature of our model relates to the forces motivating 
its development and choice of specifications. Our model is not designed to  
* Studies using this approach include: I .  Adelman and S. Robinson (1978), F. Ahmed (1974), L. de Bever 
(1976), J .  G .  Williamson and L. de Bever (1977). J .  Edmonston, W. C. Sanderson, and J .  Sapoznikow 
(1976), A. C. Kelley and J .  G .  Willia~nson (1974). A. C. Kelley, J .  G .  Williamson, and R. J .  Cheetham 
(1972), K. Mera (1975). R. Mohan (1977), J .  G .  Williamson (1974), M. Yamaguchi (1973), L. Yap (1972, 
1976a), J .  de Melo (1978), J .  de Melo and S. Robinson (1978). and I.'. Lysy and L. Taylor (1977). 
t The demographic model is being developed by R. M. Schmidt, and will be presented in The D e m e  
graphic Dimensio~ts of Economic Population Modeling, forthcoming. The broad elements of Mr. Schmidt's 
model are outlined above. 
explain the behavior of a specific low-income country. A case study approach 
is more appropriate t o  this task. Rather, our goal has been to  capture the key 
features of a group of Third World, growing countries which are price-takers in 
international markets (around 50 countries fulfill this specification). Ours is 
a model of "representative" Third World countries. In developing our theo- 
retical specifications, we have benefited notably from the results of extensive 
empirical analysis undertaken on a sample of 22 such countries. For this pur- 
pose data from the World Bank, the United Nations, the International Labour 
Office, country studies, and the general economics literature have all been 
systematically exploited. It is our view that theorizing is most likely to  succeed 
where there is sensitivity to  empirical reality. Moreover, a model of theoretical 
elegance that cannot be empirically implemented is of little use. In many 
instances our theoretical specifications have been conditioned by this con- 
straint. While the present paper focuses on modeling urbanization, demographic 
change, and economic growth, it is to be emphasized that the model has drawn 
upon an extensive data base. 
1.3 Issues and Analysis: The Counterfactual 
While the model we have developed is parsimonious in its specification, it is 
still sufficiently large to require numerical techniques to  analyze the results. 
For this purpose we will estimate the parameters and initial conditions using 
data for our "representative" countries, and employing the methodology now 
common to  this type of general-equilibrium modeling (see Kelley, Williamson, 
and Cheetharn, 1972, chp. 4). With estimation complete, the model will then 
be simulated over a quarter of a century. Does the model replicate historical 
Third World experience since the 1950s? The answer will be supplied by the 
comparison of the model's dynamic forecasts with time series of relevant 
endogenous variables documented in World Tables 19 76. 
The second stage of analysis will involve an examination of comparative 
static results. Considerable insight into the workings of the model can be 
obtained by using tlie relatively simple tools of short-run comparative statics, 
where the labor force, the stock of skills, technology, and capital assets are all 
exogenous. Moreover, comparative static analysis is especially suited to  sen- 
sitivity analysis: critical parameters for which empirical information is more 
tenuous can be identified with greater clarity. In addition, since the profession 
is far less confident about economic dynamics, it might be especially fruitful 
to  explore that portion of the model about which we are more certain, before 
pressing on to  the comparative dynamics. 
After completing the comparative static analysis, we shall then turn to 
the more speculative comparative dynamics. Our first goal will be to  confront 
conventional "growth" issues by exploring the impact of the rate and bias of 
technical progress, the saving parameters, and public and private demand 
parameters. The historical counterfactual will also be employed at this stage, 
where one or more parameters representing historically relevant situations will 
be varied and the resulting consequences examined. We also expect to  dwell a t  
length on policy counterfactuals. A sample of these counterfactuals follows. 
Government policy toward "squatters' settlements." Some countries 
have acted t o  limit the size of urban squatters' settlements, even by 
the violent means of razing poor residential areas. The impact of such 
policies can be captured in our model in various ways. 
Government education policy. The demographic model will be 
equipped t o  handle changes in government educational policy 
through its impact either o n  the drop-out rate and/or on the rate of 
entry in to  the formal educational system. With a lag, such policy will 
have an impact on the stock of "urban trainables" and thus the rate 
of expansion in the stock of unskilled labor. I t  should also influence 
immigration rates and urbanization. 
Government andlor union policy toward the "wage gap" between 
modern and informal service sectors. The economic model postulates 
a nominal wage gap between modern sector unskilled labor employ- 
ment and the informal urban service sector. Variations in this gap can 
be explored in the model and its impact on the distribution of 
income, migration, and urbanization evaluated. 
Energy scarcity and the Organization for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Imported raw materials include fuel, and the 
price of these imports are exogenously determined in world markets. 
Counterfactual changes in the price of such imports can be investi- 
gated in the model, and in particular, their influence on the internal 
price structure, the rate of urbanization, growth, and distribution. 
Urban property taxes. Very few Third World economies have urban 
property taxes, but debate over their use should increase especially 
in the face of rising land scarcity, notable capital gains in land, and 
the presence of "empty lots" in otherwise dense urban centers. The 
model allows us t o  examine the impact of such policies on urban- 
ization, rents, and income distribution. 
Population policy. The demographic model will treat mortality and 
fertility as exogenous variables (subject to  variation over regions and 
thus subject t o  aggregate variations as urbanization proceeds). The 
present model is well equipped to  trace through many of the likely 
economic impacts of government population policy. Indeed, this 
exercise will be especially helpful in identifying the impact of 
"population explosions" on Third World urbanization experience. 
Government policy toward financial institutions and its impact on  
migrants' remittances. Urban migrant remittances (as a share of 
income) t o  rural households are given exogenously in our model. The 
remittance rate will be influenced by the availability of financial 
institutions t o  facilitate the transfer. The model is equipped t o  
explore the impact of such changes o n  the structure of demand and 
other  key endogenous variables in the system, especially migration 
and urbanization itself. 
8.  Foreign aid and government attitude toward saving "self-sufficiency. " 
Many countries are taking a more jaundiced view of foreign assistance 
and multinationals' investment. Since private and public foreign 
capital is given exogenously in the model, we can readily examine 
the impact of reductions in these "aid" levels. In particular, we 
shall be able t o  examine the extent t o  which domestic investment 
responds to  changes in foreign aid. 
9. The role o f  the export tax and import tariff. The  general equilibrium 
impact of export tax and import  tariff policies can easily be evaluated 
in the model. Endogenous variables of interest include distribution 
and the rural out-migration rate from agriculture. 
This is only a sample of policy counterfactuals, but  i t  should give a flavor of 
the scope of  the model. 
Central t o  the analysis are the questions: What are the sources of urban- 
ization? What can we expect the urbanization experience in the remainder of 
the twentieth century t o  be like? What role have policy and demographic forces 
played in influencing Third World urbanization experience? 
2 MODELING URBANIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
2.1 Sectoral Activities: A n  Overview 
Our economy consists of eight sectors, each of which produces a single 
homogenous commodity or  service. These sectors have a specific spatial 
location, urban or  rural, and produce tradeables and nontradeables. As we shall 
see, the distinction between tradeables and nontradeables is central t o  cost-of- 
living differentials between regions and thus potentially important t o  the 
migration process and t o  urbanization. The tradeable and nontradeable distinc- 
tion is also relevant t o  the international exchange and specialization choices 
open t o  the economy. While the inclusion of nontradeable service activities has 
become familiar in the literature o n  computable general equilibrium models, 
we feel they are especially important in understanding the growth-inequality- 
urbanization process and have yet  t o  receive the emphasis they deserve. 
There are two commodity producing sectors in the model: manufactures 
and primary products, both of which are tradeable internationally and inter- 
regionally. Their empirical counterparts are the following: the manufactures 
sector M includes both mining and manufacturing, since these sectors have 
broadly comparable technological characteristics. The primary product sector 
A includes agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Clearly, the M-sector is an urban 
activity while the A-sector is rural. No effort has been made in this report t o  
distinguish between the subsistence and commercialized farm sectors, although 
we hope t o  d o  so in case-study applications of the model. 
Service-sector activities are highlighted in the model, especially those that 
are not tradeable between locations. Th:re are six service-sector activities. The 
modern capital-cum-skill intensive service sector KS has, as its empirical 
counterpart, the combination of electricity, gas, water, transportation, com- 
munications, defense, education, other government services, and construction 
o f  what we call urban high-cost housing stocks. While the output of  the KS 
sector cannot be traded internationally, it can be traded interregionally within 
the economy. It is urban location-specific and is the  central activity supplying 
the final demand needs generated by the government sector. Given demand 
conditions t o  be discussed below, the KS sector can be expected t o  be one of  
the "leading" growth sectors in our developing economy, a feature commonly 
ignored in development models. 
Recent qualitative models of migration (Todaro, 1969; Corden and 
Findley, 1975; Yap, 1972, 1976a) have focused a t  length on the  urban 
"traditional" service sector as a source of low-productivity urban employment, 
and it has figured importantly in current conventional wisdom regarding the 
determinants of rural-urban migration and the rate of urbanization in the 
Third World. The literature has made no effort, however, t o  introduce similar 
activities for the rural sector, ignoring Hymer and Resnick's (1969) useful 
emphasis on rural "Z goods" activities. We have chosen t o  follow Hymer and 
Resnick by introducing symmetry in to  the model. The rural labor-intensive 
service sector RS and the urban labor-intensive service sector US both produce 
services with empirical counterparts including domestics, personal services, and 
the construction of lower-quality housing stocks for relatively low-income 
wage earners. These two "traditional" labor-intensive service sectors d o  not 
produce outputs tradeable between regions and here lies one potential source 
of cost-of-living differences between urban and rural areas. 
The  model is completed by the addition of  three remaining service 
sectors. all of which produce housing services from location-specific housing 
stocks. There is only one such housing activity in the rural sector, H, RS, since 
housing stocks there appear t o  be predominately low-cost, labor-intensive 
structures. The  model will be developed t o  permit housing rents t o  be lower in 
rural areas, thereby providing the farm sector with a cost-of-living advantage. 
Relatively cheap rural labor might yield that  result by itself, but  high site 
rents attached t o  scarce urban land should reinforce the rental differential. 
There are two housing activities in the urban sector: a higher-cost housing 
sector H, KS constructed by "modern" relatively capital-intensive methods 
and consumed by higher income groups; and a lower-cost housing sector 
H, US constructed by "traditional" labor-intensive methods thus generating 
lower-quality housing for the urban poor a t  low rents. Accessibility of this 
low-cost housing, the government's attitude toward squatter settlements, 
and thus the level of urban rents will figure importantly in migration decisions 
in our model. 
In reality, there is a continuum of housing units by quality. The 
dichotomy embedded in our model reflects an important aspect of that 
continuum - the differing nature of construction technology as well as the 
different costs implied. Since housing represents the most important asset in 
the household's portfolio, and accounts for most o f  the household's investment 
activity, we felt it important t o  elaborate on its nature, especially in the urban 
area where issues of migration and asset accumulation, related to  housing, may 
be particularly important t o  the process of development and structural change. 
2.2 Technological Conditions and Factor Inputs 
Like all models of economic dualism, ours stresses production dualism. (A 
complete mathematical statement of the model can be found in the appendix. 
Equation numbers in the text are consistent with those in the appendix.) Thus, 
the eight sectoral activities exhibit quite different rates of technical progress, 
factor-intensity, distributional attributes, and substitution elasticities. 
It is assumed that the production process in all sectors (except rural hous- 
ing) can be described by a continuous, twice-differentiable, single-valued func- 
tion. Conventional physical capital, K,, is used in agriculture, manufacturing, 
and the modem service sector. although it is specific t o  a given sector once in 
place. Unskilled labor, L, ,  is used in all sectors except housing, and is mobile be- 
tween them, subject t o  migration rules t o  be discussed later. Skilled labor, S,, is 
utilized in the M and KS sectors only while Iand, R ,  is used as an input in both 
agriculture and urban housing. Each of these four factors of production is homo- 
geneous. Production is subject t o  constant returns t o  scale and diminishing mar- 
ginal rates of substitution are assumed t o  prevail. Joint products are excluded 
and external economies (and diseconomies) do not exist. It is assumed that 
factor-augmenting technical change applies t o  capital, skills, and labor but not  to  
land. Thus each sector is analogous t o  a large firm or industry having a production 
function and exhibiting optimal behavior. Such behavior implies cost minimiza- 
tion with respect to iriputs and revenue maximizatio~l with respect t o  outputs. 
The production processes in the two modern urban sectors are viewed 
to  be more capital-cum-skill intensive than in agriculture. The importance 
o f  factor-intensity differentials has been appreciated since Eckaus ( 1955) 
brought it t o  our attention. He argued that in underdevelopzd economies 
agriculture was far less capital intensive, which, together with differences in 
elasticities of factor substitution, gave rise to  the phenomenon of "technological 
dualism." We shall impose alternate restrictions consistent with his view: 
namely that the current elasticity of substitution in urban modern sectors is 
less than one, while it is equal to  one in agriculture (i.e., Cobb-Douglas). There 
is abundant empirical evidence supporting this view (Chenery and Raduchel, 
197 1 ; Fallon and Layard, 1975 ; Yotopolous and Nugent, 1976). 
The modern urban-sector production functions must capture these overall 
attributes, but the presence of three factors of production makes the conven- 
tional constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function inappro- 
priate. Since it is not possible to  confront the issue of earnings distribution 
without paying explicit attention to labor heterogeneity, we have insisted that 
the working population be distinguished, a t  the very minimum, by skilled and 
unskilled labor. Furthermore, we are convinced by several empirical studies 
that the elasticity of substitution between each of the three pairs of inputs in 
these modern sectors is  NO^ the same. Rather, we are persuaded that conven- 
tional capital and skills are relative complements (Griliches, 1969; Fallon and 
Layard, 1975; Kesselman, Williamson, and Berndt, 1977) and that this fact 
goes a long way in accounting for the phenomena of rising skilled-wage premia, 
"wage stretching" (Morley and Williamson, 1977), and increased earnings 
inequality in much of the Third World where capital accumulation is so rapid. 
Given the need to specify modern-sector production functions that allow 
for relative complementarity between skilled labor and capital, the usual CES 
production function cannot be employed. The most useful specification for 
our purposes is the "two-level" or "nested" CES first proposed by Sato (1967) 
and since applied to developing economies in a number of case studies (Bowles, 
1970; Fallon and Layard, 1975; Edmonston, Sanderson, and Sapoznikow, 
1976; Lysy and Taylor, 1977; Adelman and Robinson, 1978). This function 
separates factors into groups and generates an index for one group using the 
CES function in its usual form. This index is then combined in another CES 
function to generate value-added output. In our case, @i is a composite index 
of conventional and human capital (skills) inputs, and ti are distribution 
parameters, and oi and oi are elasticities of substitution. Following Eckaus 
and the "structuralists" (Chenery and Raduchel, 197 1 ), we anticipate that 
these substitution elasticities will generally fall below unity. 
Furthermore, we anticipate that the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and skilled labor will be significantly less than that between unskilled 
labor and composite capital, thus conforming t o  the capital-skill comple- 
mentarity hypothesis. The implication of this hypothesis is that rapid physical 
capital accumulation in the modern sector tends t o  raise the demand for 
skilled relative to  unskilled labor. Accumulation tends to  breed earnings 
inequality in our model as a result. 
Moving from a value-added to a gross-output production function where 
intermediate inputs are specified explicitly, we shall consider separately those 
inputs supplied domestically and those obtained from abroad. Imported inter- 
mediate inputs Zi, including fuel, have been incorporated in both modern 
sectors. Intermediate input demands are almost always captured by fixed 
coefficients in development and planning models. Such Leontief-like specifi- 
cations might be appropriate in short-run applications, but they are unaccept- 
able in a model covering a 20- to 30-year span, especially given the OPEC 
shocks of the 1970s (Hoffman and Jorgenson, 1977; Berndt and Wood, 1979). 
Since it is mandatory to admit the possibility of economizing on imported raw 
material inputs if the longer-run implications of OPEC pricing policies are to  be 
sensibly investigated, substitution between imported inputs, domestically sup- 
plied intermediate inputs, and the conventional primary inputs must be allowed. 
Imported non-competitive inputs are combined with other domestic and 
primary factor inputs following a Cobb-Douglas specification. While this 
specification introduces greater flexibility into our economy's structure, 
aspects of "import dependency" associated with modern-sector expansion can 
still be investigated with our model. In particular, our specification permits 
analysis of unbalanced sectoral growth on aggregate imported intermediate 
inputs, especially fuels, given different import intensities by sector. Chenery 
and Raduchel (1971) have demonstrated that the latter can be a relatively 
important aspect of import dependency in a typical developing country. This 
specification also makes it possible to explore the impact of changes in the 
price of such imports on the industrialization and urbanization process. Since 
Zi is imported at exogenous world market prices, the impact of changes in 
such prices, attributable, for example, t o  OPEC policy, can be readily explored. 
The model also allows for domestic intermediate inputs, although we take 
a somewhat restricted view of their importance. The output of both traditional 
service sectors is treated as satisfying final demand only, a reasonable assump- 
tion since they are dominated by domestics, personal services, and highly labor- 
intensive low-cost housing construction. Neither of these two sectors enters 
into the intersectoral production flows. The same is true of housing services, 
or the rental stream generated by housing stocks. The motivation for the 
addition of the remaining intersectoral production flows is to recognize the 
direct and indirect output mix changes induced by demand or supply changes 
in a given sector. One of our key interests is to account for trends in the 
distribution of income and earnings. By focusing on direct factor requirements 
only, and given factor-intensity differences across sectors, we would surely 
exaggerate induced changes in factor demand were we to ignore these direct 
factor requirements induced by the input-output relationships. 
The two modern-sector production functions take the following form:* 
* Equation numbers correspond with the mathematical statement in the appendix. 
where Qi is gross output in sector i, Zi is imported raw materials, QiSj are 
intersectoral inputs (excluding intrasectoral inputs), aiPj are the cost shares of 
each factor in gross sales, Gi is a composite input index of conventional and 
human capital (skills), ti and are distribution parameters, and ai and a: are 
substitution elasticities. Factor-augmenting technical progress determines the 
level of x(t) ,  y(t) ,  and z(t); xKi ,  ySi,  and zLi will be referred t o  as "efficiency 
capital," "efficiency skilled labor," and "efficiency labor" in what follows. 
Agriculture's production function is specified as Cobb-Douglas: 
where QA denotes gross agricultural output,  and RA the endogenously deter- 
mined stock of land, unaugrnented by technical progress.* 
Following the now standard conventions in the formal literature 
(Mazumdar, 1975), the traditional service sectors utilize unskilled labor inputs 
only. In the absence of sector-specific technological change, the average 
physical product of efficiency labor diminishes with the continued application 
of labor, and the law of diminishing returns is held t o  prevail (a i  < 1). Thus, 
Below we shall assume that labor in the traditional service sectors is paid its 
average product, thus satisfying product exhaustion. Since much of the 
traditional service labor is self-employed (barbers, vendors), the difference 
between average and marginal product may be considered as a reward for 
entrepreneurship. 
Housing services are produced by the combined inputs of existing 
residential structures and land. Housing is obviously quite different than the 
other five commodity and service activities since it utilizes neither labor nor 
"productive" capital. Housing is, therefore, discussed more conveniently as a 
separate topic, in conjunction with land-market and optimal land-use issues 
(see Section 2.8). 
2.3 Commodity Prices, Service Prices, and Aspects of Tax Policy 
Prices of manufactured and agricultural goods are determined exogenously by 
the combined influences of world market prices and the country's commercial 
policy. Thus, import substitution and tariff policy is captured by an equivalent 
a d  valorem tariff rate, r T S M ,  SO that 
* See Binswanger (1974) on the factor-augmenting attributes of agriculture in the American twentieth 
century case. 
where Pb refers to value-added price, PM refers to domestic selling price, and 
the country is assumed to be a price taker in world markets at P g  .* This 
describes the bulk of developing countries but excludes, most notably, those 
which are endowed with exceptional deposits of exportable raw materials, 
where these exports loom large not only in the country's exports, but in world 
trade as well. 
Agriculture is much more difficult to  capture with a simple model since 
in reality the Third World is beset with a bewildering variety of export taxes, 
marketing boards, and subsidies and taxes on purchased inputs (Hayami and 
Ruttan, 197 1 ; Johnston and Kilby, 1975; Schultz, 1978). Our "representative" 
economy is assumed to have the following attributes regarding agricultural 
markets: the country is a price taker, subsidies and taxes are applied to  pur- 
chased inputs from manufacturing (e.g., fertilizer), and export taxes are 
common. Thus, domestic agricultural prices are exogenous and "distorted" by 
policy in the following way: 
PA 'a =:(I + rTVx)-l (1 I )  
where PA refers to the domestic selling price, Pi refers to  the value added 
price (received by farmers), T ~ , ~  is an average ad valorem equivalent export 
tax, and r A , ~  refers to  the domestic tax or subsidy on purchased inputs in the 
agricultural sector. The relative magnitudes of these two taxes will determine 
the extent to  which agriculture is "squeezed." 
The treatment of the export tax may be made more transparent. The 
value of exports expressed in domestic prices (PAXA) is taxed at the rate 
rTSX SO that 
PAXA(l + T T , ~ )  = P I X A  
which with some simple manipulation yields equation (1 1). An increase in 
this tax serves to  diminish domestic output, increase domestic demand at the 
lower domestic prices (a source of subsidy to  the urban workforce at the 
* It should also be noted that per unit value-added prices should exhaust total factor payments per unit 
of output. Thus, 
- 
Ph = wM,SaM,S + WM,LaM,L + 'MaM,K Q M , F ~ M  
where w ~ j  are wage rates, r~ is the return to  capital, and a ~ j  is the endogenous input-output ratio of 
factor j to  value added. Similar conditions hold for all other sectors. 
FIGURE 1 Partial equilibrium analysis of the export tax. 
farmer's expense), diminish exports, but  may or may not  change government 
tax revenues, depending on domestic demand and supply elasticities. This can 
be seen in Figure 1.  
The  remaining prices in our  model (rural services, PRs; urban traditional 
services, Pus; urban modern services, PKs) are all determined endogenously 
where, in addition, 
following the same notation as above. (Rents are discussed in Section 2.8.) 
There are other commodity taxes present in the model, but  since they appear 
as expenditure o r  sales taxes, we need not  discuss them until we confront the 
government sector (Section 2.10) and the private sector demand system 
(Section 2.1 I). 
A possible extension of the model would be t o  include transport costs. 
thereby providing an  added regional dimension. There is accumulating evidence, 
however, that simple modeling of transportation yields little insight o r  impact 
in general equilibrium systems of this type. In a study of Indian economic 
development, for example, Rakesh Mohan (1977) highlighted transport costs 
in an  attempt t o  gain an insight into intersectoral commodity flows, factor 
migration, and urbanization. Mohan regarded transport as an  intermediate 
good produced by the industrial sector. Transport demand originated from 
movements of final and intermediate goods between urban and rural areas, 
and regional commodity prices differed by a factor of proportionality t o  reflect 
transport margins. Simulation experiments revealed a negligible impact even 
when transport margins were increased fivefold. Williamson and d e  Bever (1977) 
have also experimented with transport margins in a general equilibrium model 
of Japanese historical development. Their formulation focused on the cost 
of moving agricultural goods t o  urban markets. As with the Indian case, 
Williamson and de Bever find trade margins had little quantitative impact on 
the course of Japanese growth and structural change. 
Based on these and other findings, we are reluctant t o  include interregional 
transportation in the present model. T o  do so properly would involve data 
requirements o n  transportation production activities, as well as product- 
specific trade margins, that are extremely scarce for most developing countries. 
And the studies cited above have already shown that simple formulations of 
transport costs yield little added insight and negligible quantitative impact. 
2.4 Labor Demand, Labor Supply, and Wage Determination 
Economy-wide supplies of skilled and unskilled labor are exogenously given at 
any point in time in the static model. This is not true over time, of course, 
since skills are augmented endogenously (Section 2.7) and unskilled labor 
grows in response to  long-run demographic forces (Section 2.14). Although 
total labor supplies are given by previous history in the static model, the distri- 
bution of the labor force over space and across sectors is not. The next section 
will analyze the migration behavior embedded in the model which determines 
labor allocation. The present section will focus on labor demand and wage 
determination in the absence of migration forces. 
There are five sectors that employ unskilled labor: 
where LR is the total rural unskilled labor force and Lu  is the total urban 
unskilled labor force. Overt unemployment is not  an attribute of our model 
since very few unskilled laborers in the Third World can afford the luxury, 
having few or no assets t o  finance significant periods of overt unemployment. 
Apparently this characteristic holds true even for rural immigrants to  some 
Third World cities, since the evidence suggests that they secure employment 
relatively soon after arrival (Yotopoulos, 1977, chp. 6 ;  Yap, 1976, 1977). 
Low-productivity uilderemployment in the traditional service sectors appears 
to  offer a better measure of the extent of labor surplus (Mazumdar, 1975). 
With the exception of the two labor-intensive service sectors, efficiency 
factors are assumed t o  be paid their marginal value products, provided that, a t  
each point in time, the marginal value product of efficiency labor in each 
sector is sufficient t o  allow every member of the unskilled labor force t o  
consume at  levels that satisfy subsistence. We interpret "subsistence" t o  be the 
level o f  per  ca~7ita consumption considered by households t o  be essential for 
their welfare. This minimum level of consumption will be defined explicitly 
when we turn to the household demand system, but for the moment we shall 
assume that it is above the caloric level at  which starvation occurs, and that it 
also exceeds levels at which marginal increases in consumption significantly 
influence productivity, efficiency, and thus earnings. (See Fei and Chiang, 
1966; Mirrlees, 1975.) 
Defining iTi , ,  to be the wage per efficiency unskilled laborer in the ith 
sector, annual earnings can be denoted by wi,, = ziTi,, where, we will recall, 
z is a factor of augmentation through technical change (or utilization). Thus, 
wage equations for these five sectors can be written as 
i = M ,  KS and where Pd = & 
Note that marginal product pricing does not hold in the informal service 
sectors, but rather average value product determines wages there. I t  may be 
appealing to  view wage determination in traditional services as the result of 
income sharing. Alternatively, the output produced above the laborer's marginal 
product may be considered a premium of entrepreneurship distributed back to  
the laborers - a view consistent with the fact that self-employment and family 
enterprise dominate this sector. 
I t  might be helpful to  emphasize two issues at  this point: the distinction 
between wage rates and annual earnings, on the one hand, and the structure of 
earnings by occupation-sector, on the other. Both of these issues are important 
t o  income distribution patterns generated by the model. First, we have shown 
elsewhere that wage rates and earnings can behave quite differently over time 
in the developing economy, depending, to  a large part, on the character of tech- 
nical progress. (See Kelley, Williamson, and Cheetham, 1972, chps. 4, 5, and 8.) 
As we shall see in Section 2.13, labor-saving technological change implies rapid 
increases in z, an influence that serves to  suppress the rise in the real wage rate, 
confirming the historical evidence of wage stability. Yet that influence also 
seems to drive a wedge between wage rates and annual earnings, the latter 
rising even in the face of wage-rate stability. Thus, stability in the wage-rate 
of efficiency unskilled labor does not necessarily imply stability in wage 
earnings or, for that matter,. stability in the unskilled labor's share. Second, 
our choice of migration rules will be crucial in determining the structure of 
earnings among the unskilled in our model.' If we were to  assume complete 
factor mobility between sectors, and thus wage equalization, there would be 
no  room tor anything other than a fully egalitarian distribution of unskilled 
earnings: all earnings inequality would take the form of wage differentials 
between skilled and unskilled labor. Migration specifications become important, 
therefore, to  the distribution patterns generated in any model of Third World 
economies. 
Equations (19 j ( 2 3 )  can be readily converted into sectoral (unskilled) 
labor requirements, demand conditions that are central to  issues of employ- 
ment, labor migration, income distribution, and urbanization. Sectoral unskilled 
labor demands are, therefore, written as the combined influence of technology, 
output levels, and, of course, real wages themselves: 
It  should be clear from these labor demand functions that wage elasticities 
vary across sectors, being higher in agriculture (unity) than in the modem 
sectors where ai is usually less than unity. 
Consider next the skilled labor market. Skilled labor supplies, S ,  are given 
at  some exogenous level in the static model, depending on previous experience 
with skill accumulation. Since skilled labor is utilized only in the two modern 
urban sectors it follows that 
Defining GiSs to  be the wage per efficiency skilled laborer in the ith sector, his 
annual earnings can be denoted by w i , ,  = yGi, ,  where y  is a factor of augmen- 
tation comparable to  that for unskilled labor. Once again marginal productivity 
conditions are invoked so that 
i = M, KS and where Ph = F,& 
As with unskilled labor, these two wage equations can be converted into 
skilled-labor demand functions: 
2.5 Labor Migration and Wage "Gaps" 
Research on the determinants of labor migration in developing economies has 
proceeded along two lines. The first has its source in formal dualistic labor 
transfer models where the treatment of migration has typically been quite 
simplistic. The Lewis (1 954), Fei-Ranis (196 l ) ,  Jorgenson (196 1, 1967), and 
Kelley-Williamson-Cheetham (1972) models all exploit the hypothesis that 
current wage differentials induce labor migration between sectors. Since the 
significance of wage differentials as a determinant of migration is well 
documented (Beals et  al. 1967; Sahota, 1968; Yap, 1976b), the hypothesis 
would hardly seem contestable. Yet, this evidence hardly justifies the extreme 
but common assumption in the general equilibrium literature that wages are in 
fact equalized by the process of migration. In fact, nominal wage equalization 
is not observed in the Third World (Reynolds, 1965; Johnston and Nielsen, 
1966; Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974), although the lion's share of the observed 
nominal wage "gaps" appears to  be due to skill and cost-of-living differences 
(on the alleged Brazilian "low-wage" northeast, see Fishlow, 1972; on the 
alleged American "low-wage" south, see Bellante, 1979). Since it is widely 
recognized that wage differentials are not the sole determinant of migration, 
and that all determinants are not necessarily economic, we cannot adopt whole- 
sale the simple wage equalization assumptions of the simpler general equi- 
librium models in a more policy-oriented framework, especially one like ours 
which focuses on the urbanization process. 
A second line of thought extends the classical treatment of the migration 
decision. Either it includes an urban unemployment (or underemployment) 
variable, and thus focuses on expected annual earnings differentials (Todaro, 
1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Zarembka, 1972; Corden and Findlay, 1975), 
or it utilizes a capital theoretic framework that explicitly introduces present 
value calculations, migration costs, job search, and distributed lags (Sjaastad, 
1962; Kelley, Williamson, and Cheetham, 1972; Williamson and de Bever, 
1977). In particular, the Todaro framework has enjoyed considerable popu- 
larity over the past decade and there have been many attempts to  introduce 
this hypothesis into static and dynamic intersectoral development models. 
The Todaro hypothesis is simple and elegant. While similar statements can 
be found elsewhere (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Stiglitz, 1974), the most effec- 
tive illustration can be found in Corden and Findlay (1975), reproduced in 
Figure 2 assuming perfect capital mobility. There are only two sectors 
analyzed, but they are sufficient to  illustrate the point. Under the extreme 
assumption of wage equalization through migration, and in the absence of wage 
rigidities, equilibrium is achieved at E (the point of intersection of the two 
labor demand curves, AA' and MM'). Here w: = w; and the urbanization rate 
is O M L & / L ,  where M denotes the manufacturing sector and A denotes agricul- 
ture. In addition, the Corden-Findlay model incorporates the widely-held 
belief that the wage rate of Third World manufacturing sectors is "pegged" at  
artificially high levels, say at  gM. If overt unemployment is assumed away, then 
FIGURE 2 The Harris-Todaro-Corden-Findlay Model. 
all who fail to  secure the favored jobs in the M sector would accept lower- 
paying jobs in the A-sector at w,**. 
Clearly, the level of employment in the urban sector has been choked off 
by the high wage in the manufacturing sector and both migration and urban- 
ization have been forestalled. As Todaro initially pointed out, however, 
urbanization rates have been dramatic in the Third World and furthermore 
there has been an expansion in traditional urban service underemployment (see 
also Sabot, 1975 ; Mazumdar, 1975 ; Rogers, 1977; Merrick, 1978). Todaro 
explains this apparent conflict (e.g., migration in the face of urban under- 
employment) by developing an expectations hypothesis which, in its simplest 
form, states that the favored jobs are allocated by "lottery," that the potential 
migrant calculates the expected value of that lottery ticket, and compares it 
with the certain employment in the rural sector. Migration then takes place 
until the urban expected wage is equated to  the rural wage. Given the "pegged" 
RM, at what rural wage would the migrant be indifferent between "under- 
employment" in the traditional urban service sector and employment in the 
agricultural sector? If his probability of getting the favored job is simply the 
ratio of LM to the total urban labor pool, L,, then the expression 
indicates the agricuitural wage at which he is indifferent between employment 
locations. This is in fact the qq' curve in Figure 2. The equilibrium agricultural 
wage, wA, and urban underemployment (e.g., the size of the traditional, 
unorganized sector) is thus given at Z.* 
The HarrisTodaro curve, qq', is a rectangular hyperbola with unitary elasticity. The elasticity of the 
labor demand curve in the urban "modern" sectors is assumed to be less than unity in Figure 2 according 
to our expectations revealed in Section 2.4. 
While this conventional wisdom is elegant, we adopt it here only with 
qualifications. These qualifications are motivated by the following observations. 
First, we are not convinced that WM can be viewed as "pegged" in the Third 
World and independent of market forces. (See Mazumdar, 1975; House and 
Rempel, 1978; Henley and House, 1978.) Put differently, the apparent wage 
rigidity attributed t o  institutional factors (unions, government regulations) may 
in fact be explained by market forces, with institutions merely responding to  
those forces (Taylor, 1979, chp. 5). In any case, we have no  way of projecting 
such a fixed wage into the future, and without that information dynamic 
analysis is sorely limited. 
Second, we agree with Willis (1979) that the lottery view of who gets 
favored jobs is naive and ignores property rights. I t  seems to us that the allo- 
cation of new job vacancies in the favored sectors is hardly random, but rather 
very much a function of bribes, nepotism, employment search costs, union 
dues, and the like. That is, these favored jobs have property rights earning 
rents that command an implicit or explicit price. Third, the Todaro formulation 
ignores the obvious fact that the majority of the favored jobs are more skill- 
intensive than either farm labor or traditional urban service activity. Finally, 
and we think most important, the formulation ignores cost-of-living differ- 
entials between regions. 
Our own approach is a hybrid which attempts to  meet at  least some of 
these criticisms. On the one hand, we assume perfect mobility of unskilled 
labor within the rural sector since everyone seems to agree that free entry and 
costless mobility are reasonable approximations there. We make the same 
assumption for both skilled and unskilled labor between the two modern urban 
sectors, certainly an zcceptable premise t o  the Todaro adherents given their 
willingness to  aggregate all modern-sector activities. Thus, 
W A , L  = W R S , L  (26) 
W ~ , ~  = W ~ ~ , ~  (27) 
W M , L  = W K S , L  
On the other hand, we model the unskilled wage gap between traditional 
urban services and the modern sectors by inserting an exogenous differential K 
that reflects the costs of the property right as discussed above. Thus, 
- 
W M , L  = W K S . L  - K W U S , L  (28) 
Finally, and most important, the rural-urban migration process must be 
specified. Here we adopt a position which is closer in spirit to  the Todaro 
hypothesis, but, we feel, with more t o  defend it. The potential rural-urban 
migrant is assumed to behave as if he calculates an expected urban nominal 
wage, w , .  This wage is simply the weighted average of potential urban 
unskilled earnings and skilled earnings (net of taxes), wherp the weights are 
marginal probabilities rather than average probabilities, as in the simple 
Corden- Findlay version. Thus, 
where r y  is the income tax rate on high-wage skilled labor. The migrant has 
accessible current information on city wages, but not on his employment 
probabilities. Thus employment weights are lagged one year in the migrant's 
calculation of expected urban income.* In summary, the migrant is induced 
into the cities with the anticipation of having the chance of gaining one of two 
favored modern-sector jobs: either unskilled employment at a higher wage rate, 
or  training and perhaps subsequent skilled employment at an even higher wage. 
Training and skills creation will be discussed in Section 2.7 when we confront 
the dynamic specifications in the model. 
Finally, we assume that the migrant is not motivated solely by nominal 
(expected) wage gaps, but rather by real income differentials. Thus, 
where the location-specific cost-of-living indices, COLi, are influenced by price 
differentials for nontradeables as well as budget weights. This specification will 
be discussed at greater length when the household demand system is elaborated 
in Section 2.1 1. 
In summary, our model is capable of generating an endogenous earnings 
structure in four dimensions: rural unskilled earnings, urban traditional-sector 
unskilled earnings, modern-sector unskilled earnings, and skilled earnings. The 
wage spread over these employment categories will be determined by the endo- 
genous forces of market demand, supply, and the migration process itself. The 
speed of urbanization will be determined by the same set of forces. While 
expectations of favored sector employment may well generate the Todaro 
result of "over-urbanization," it is also possible that cost-of-living influences 
may choke off that tendency without the overt introduction of government 
policy. The issue is an empirical one. 
2.6 "Productive" Capital Markets 
Our assumption that efficiency factors are paid their marginal value products 
applies not only to  labor, but to  physical capital as well. Thus, the sectoral 
rates of return t o  capital ri are written as 
In our specification of skill augmentation and training (Section 2.7, equation (90)), we introduce a 
longer lag for migrants in obtaining skilled employment. For simplicity, this feature has been sup  
pressed in the migration equation, since it would introduce unnecessary complexity of little empirical 
consequence. 
We assume capital immobility, so after-tax rates of return need not be 
equalized between sectors. That is, once investment is allocated to  a given 
sector and used to augment the capital stock there, the new stock of capital 
becomes specific to  that production activity. Thus, any economic event that 
serves to  raise the rate of return in one sector, relative to  another, will tend to 
generate rate of return differentials, a disequilibrium attribute typical of most 
developing economies, and often labelled as "market failure." 
On the other hand, we assume that the current pool of productive 
investment goods can be allocated freely between sectors. Indeed both private 
investors and government authorities are assumed to  allocate current saving 
(excluding, of course, that earmarked for housing investment) so as to  minimize 
rate of return differentials. The rate of return differentials minimized, however, 
are not simply the net returns on existing capital, since these are determined 
primarily by the sectoral capital stocks that are fixed in the current time 
period. Rather, private and public agents form expectations of projected rates 
of return based on investment plans that will serve to  augment sectoral capital 
stocks in the next time period. Thus, the differentials minimized by current 
investment allocation decisions might be called ex ante net (after tax) rates of 
return or quasi-rents. Formally, where the rnPi are "corporate" tax rates 
(7n.M > rn,Ks) We wish to  
RETURN DIFFERENTIALS = I [ f i  -fG( 1 -rn ,M :I l + 
MINIMIZE 
I i .M I[fi  - f i s ( l  -rn,Ks):II + 
1[f$(1 - rn ,M)k f iS ( l  - ~ I I , K s ) ~  1 '  
such that 
IM = 1i.M 
i 
where I 
The ex ante (after tax) rates of return are thus the result of the combined impact 
of the current net rate of return in sector i, [Fi - aipM], plus the expected 
impact of current net investment allocations, [Ii,, - aiKi], on that rate of 
return. 
I t  is quite possible, indeed likely, that the current net investment pool is 
insufficient t o  equalize these quasi-rents, and differentials between ex post 
rates of return may persist or increase over periods of time. Even so, some 
readers might wish t o  see more evidence of capital market fragmentation and 
ineffective financial intermediation introduced into the model. 
Indeed, there is a growing empirical literature which emphasizes capital 
market fragmentation (Gurley and Shaw, 1955, 1956, 1967; Patrick, 1966; 
Shaw, 1973), although development economists have found it difficult to  
model the process (McKinnon, 1973; de Melo, 1976, 1977). We certainly agree 
with this emphasis. As a result, critical elements of capital market imperfection 
and fragmentation are introduced explicitly into the model when we consider 
investment in human skills in Section 2.7 (individuals cannot borrow t o  finance 
skill acquisition), as well as investment in housing in Section 2.8 (households 
are restricted t o  "self-finance" and mortgage markets are nonexistent). 
Given these several elements of capital market fragmentation, we consider 
i t  relatively unproductive to  add more capital market "realism" to  our model at  
this point. In an earlier work (Kelley, Williamson, and Cheetham, 1972, chp. 7), 
we did make an effort t o  formulate a disequilibrium dualistic model which 
incorporated capital market imperfections in the allocation of conventional 
physical capital. That exercise pointed out  the heavy empirical requirements 
which this "move toward realism" implies. I t  also underscored the ad hoc 
devices used in the literature t o  circumvent the explicit estimation of key 
parameters. 
The most popular device has its origin with Rosa Luxemberg (1969), who 
assumed that all rental income was reinvested in the sector of origin. Many 
have followed in her footsteps; a recent example offered by Yap (1Y72), who 
assumed that 8 0  percent of a given sector's savings was reinvested while the 
remaining 20 percent was allocated in response t o  rates of return. 
We do  not find these ad hoc approaches t o  capital market fragmentation 
appealing, and believe that the assumptions embedded in our basic model 
supply the best starting place for an analysis of Third World urbanization and 
distribution. For  example, capital market imperfections in the skill acquisition 
process are already in our model; the absence of a mortgage market is also 
there; and the immobility of current stocks of physical (productive) capital 
adds another market-clearing constraint. All of these capital-market attributes 
are likely to  produce the relevant stylized facts of Third World development: 
persistent rate of return differentials, sectors "starved" for funds, heavy 
reliance on self-generated funds, high reinvestment rates, "thin" intersectoral 
savings flows, and an urban investment bias. The latter is assured since increas- 
ing government expenditures can be satisfied in our model only by the 
expansion of the KS sector (e.g., education, health, defense, communications), 
and increases in the KS-sector's output implies a rise in investment require- 
ments there (e.g., the construction of school buildings, medical facilities, 
harbors, airports, roads). By definition, such investment is urban based. There 
are also other forces in our model which are likely to make the rural sector 
appear "starved" for funds. 
Finally, in the remainder of this exposition we shall find it useful to  make 
reference t o  an "economy-wide discount rate." In what follows, this percentage 
rate will be defined as the average net (after taxes, excluding depreciation 
requirements) rate of return to "productive" physical capital. Equation (35) 
supplies the calculation where sectoral capital stocks are used as weights in 
computing the average: 
2.7 Education, Training, and Skills Accumulation 
The availability of skilled labor can have a potent impact on growth and 
distribution. Slow rates of growth in the stock of skills can constrain expansion 
in the two modern sectors where skilled labor is utilized in production. 
Demand shifts favoring these skill-intensive sectors will serve to  raise the skill 
premium, and produce "wage stretching" and earnings inequality (Chiswick, 
1974; Phelps-Brown, 1977). The importance of a possible skills "bottleneck" 
depends critically on the degree to  which unskilled labor and capital can be 
used as substitutes for skills. 
Debate on this issue has been extensive and until recently divided into two 
camps: the manpower "structuralists" who see little opportunity for substi- 
tution between labor of different skills, and their opponents who argue that, 
on the contrary, substitution elasticities are very high between labor of differ- 
ent skills (Bowles, 1970). The issue has apparently been resolved by recent 
empirical research (Griliches, 1969; Fallon and Layard, 1975 ; Kesselman, 
Williamson, and Berndt, 1977) which finds elasticities with intermediate values. 
These results have been incorporated in the production function specifications 
discussed in Section 2.2. 
The importance of a skilled labor bottleneck also depends on the response 
of skill accumulation to  demand conditions. Skill formation rates are a 
function of three forces in the specification which follows: the stock of 
"trainable" urban labor, the relative scarcity of skills (measured most 
commonly by the skill premium) which offers incentives to  engage in training, 
and the level of government expenditures on formal education which influences 
the ease with which "trainables" can, in fact, be converted to  skilled labor. We 
are aware that many Third World economies appear t o  exhibit a glut of formal 
school graduates. The specification which follows is designed to account for a 
variety of Third World experience, since the model may generate abundance or 
scarcity of those formally schooled. In any case, the stock of trainables will be 
limited to  urban workers only. This seems reasonable: rural workers, regardless 
of educational training, must first migrate t o  urban areas before being 
considered for training. This in itself supplies an incentive to migrate. Further- 
more, t o  the extent that such education is more accessible in the city, a house- 
hold head may well migrate to  insure the education of his children (a motive 
perhaps mislabeled as "bright lights"). 
How, then, is the skills-acquisition process modeled in our economy? We 
shall assume the training to  be financed by the industries which utilize skilled 
labor. Either due to insufficient funds implied by capital-market imperfections, 
or due to the absence of an effective "private schooling industry" or both, we 
shall assume that individuals cannot gain access to  training unless selected for 
such training by firms who find it profitable to  make such investments. The 
full cost of the training is, therefore, borne by the industries rather than the 
individual. (Trainees do bear the time cost of training, but only in foregone 
leisure.) Furthermore, we shall treat the two industries as if in collusion on 
their training investments, and that neither industry tries to  obtain a "free ride" 
simply by hiring newly skilled workers after the other industry has made the 
necessary investments. Both industries invest in training, if profitable, and 
they jointly share the fruits of that investment. 
The procedure involves first determining the returns to  investment in 
training (and thus the demand function for skills), second determining the 
costs of training (and thus the supply function for skills), and third determining 
the supply of workers actually trained. Given the latter, the training activity 
can be priced and thus the total investment requirements computed. These 
investment requirements become one component of the current saving pool. 
The economy therefore accumulates three types of long-lived assets - physical 
capital, housing, and skills. 
We are conscious of the fact that the KS sector relies heavily on skilled 
workers drawn directly from the formal education sector (clerks, bureaucrats, 
teachers, and doctors), while the M sector normally relies on blue collar 
workers who acquire skill by on-the-job training. Yet, our simplification does 
not appear to  be totally inappropriate. Public education is determined in part 
by government investment decisions, and thus the formal-education-using KS 
sector can also be viewed in the same light as the M sector. Moreover, consider- 
able training may even be required in government activity to  convert the 
formally educated student into a worker of more immediate use. 
After taxes, total profits in industry j ( j  = M, KS) are simply 
rj(l - rnsj)Kj. Total profits are augmented by the marginal addition of one 
more trained skilled worker as follows: 
a(rj[l - ~ n , j I K j )  arj[ 1 - ~n.11 aKj 
= Kj + ri[ 1 - ~ ~ , j ]  - as, asj a sj 
With physical capital stocks fixed in the short run, 
where GsSj is the marginal after-tax revenue from the addition of one skilled 
worker. 
For purposes of simplification, assume for the moment that the per unit 
cost of training a worker is constant at  c,  a parameter over which the govern- 
ment has some control. These are marginal (and average) costs common t o  both 
industries. While these training costs are all incurred in the current time period, 
the revenue stream will continue throughout the working life of the skilled 
worker. We shall assume that firms find it profitable to  train only young 
workers with a long working life ahead of them. For computational simplicity, 
we shall also assume that firms compute the present value of these anticipated 
returns supposing (1) naive expectations that @s,j shall prevail indefinitely and 
(2) that the young skilled laborer can be viewed, at  least approximately, as an 
asset with infinite life. The resulting present value of the benefit stream gen- 
erated by current investment in training is simply 
where i is the economy-wide discount rate, taken here as the weighted average 
of returns to physical capital in the various sectors. Thus, we have explicitly 
introduced the notion that training must compete with alternative investments 
in economy-wide physical accumulation. Presumably, the firm is indifferent 
between investment in training and alternative modes of accumulation such 
that current costs and capitalized benefits are equated: 
What determines the stock of potential trainables? Generally, this includes 
all of last year's unskilled workers (excluding deaths and retirements) plus all 
new entrants who are children of urban households, but excludes any of this 
year's rural in-migrants. The exclusion of recent in-migrants is based on a 
"two-staged" view of in-migration: only those of the unskilled who have 
already had some exposure to  urban work are considered trainable by modern- 
sector firms. The urban unskilled are also distinguished by their level of formal 
education (Ed), the latter dictated by previous government educational policy 
and the demographic structure of the urban population. Thus, the stock of 
urban trainables by formal educational achievement is, in the current period, 
determined exogenously. Furthermore, we shall assume that the trainability 
of the urban unskilled worker is a function of formal education: those with 
high formal-educational attainment tend to be relatively cheap to  train. 
A "step" cost function of the following kind is postulated: 
k = 0, Ed > n years ) 
perunit/ \ 
costs 
s x SY Stock of trainables 
FIGURE 3 The skills investment market. 
where k represents the formal-education class (k = 0 denoting highest attain- 
ment), and the total trainables constraint is 
where are total workers trained. 
Figure 3 portrays the training market. Anticipated returns and the 
discount rate dictate the aggregate demand function for training. High antici- 
pated returns generate buoyant demands in the two industries combined; such 
high anticipated returns may manifest themselves by skill "bottlenecks" with 
sizeable skill premia. Low rates of return t o  physical capital investment in 
A, KS, and M would yield the same result: investment in training would appear 
relatively profitable. Figure 3 illustrates two possibilities. At point X, demand 
(t i)  is slack and a substantial share of those in the k = 1 educational class would 
find themselves glutting the market and thus employed at unskilled tasks. (In 
the k = 1 class workers will be trained and BC workers will remain 
untrained.) In contrast, at point Y, a much larger share of those with formal 
education are trained as skilled workers, leaving perhaps only elementary 
school graduates (k = 2) and dropouts, plus illiterates (k = 3), in unskilled jobs. 
Note too that an expansion in demand for skilled workers may in some 
circumstances be met with a rise in skilled wages and no additional training 
(Y t o  Z), while in other circumstances the training rate may rise (X t o  Y). The 
stock of trainables by k class as well as the height of the "step" in the cost 
function both matter to  this result. 
Total training costs, or total investment in training, can be written in 
either of two ways: 
TRAINING COSTS = x ck LU,k + 
k 
k = 0, . . . ,  1-1  
TRAINING COSTS = P K S I S , K S  (95) 
where I is the optimal class trained satisfying (9 1) and (92). These training costs 
must lay claim on some real resources in the economy; that is, some "capital 
goods" sector must allocate resources t o  that investment activity and the 
investing firm's training cost ("tuition") must accrue as income to  some sector. 
As is apparent in equation (95), it seems sensible t o  us to  assign this capital 
goods activity t o  the KS sector since, after all, KS includes formal education. 
We are aware that this specification may have important implications for wag€ 
structure dynamics: high skill premia and earnings inequality imply profit- 
ability of investment in skills acquisition. The training investment response 
places demands on the KS sector. These added demands for KS output imply 
the augmentation of demand of skills (since they are used especially intensively 
there), and thus the wage premium may remain high in spite of rapid skills 
accumulation. 
Finally, it should be noted that the training activity has another cost t o  
the firm since the unskilled urban labor force is diminished by the training 
activity. Unskilled "labor scarcity" may cause a short-run rise in costs as a 
result. To the extent that rural labor supplies are elastic, urban unskilled labor 
scarcity is unlikely to  persist for the longer run. 
The model of skills accumulation presented t o  this point is one of firms 
investing in vocationally-oriented training according to their profit-maximizing 
calculus, given an exogenously determined cost-of-training function. While our 
model does not explain the cost function, changes in it can notably influence 
the rate of skills accumulation. These changes will derive primarily from 
government education policies which, while implicit in our exposition, can now 
be elaborated. 
The formal education system is not explicitly modeled in our economy. 
Education is produced within the KS sector, together with many other govern- 
ment and private services. However, such an aggregation does not preclude an 
examination of the impact of government education policies which can be 
represented in our model by altering the cost-of-training function. Two such 
policies are illustrated in Figure 3. 
For simplicity, consider the case where the share of education in the 
government's budget is constant, and two alternative policies are evaluated. 
The first policy represents a reorientation of the curriculum for the k = 1 
education class toward more vocational training. This will reduce the training 
costs facing the firm from c,  to  c', and, for a given demand (say i,), result in 
an expansion in skills investment by BB'. The second policy represents a 
reallocation of the education budget toward producing more k = 1 students at  
the expense of k = 2 students. This will expand the numbers in the k = 1 
education class to AD. If the firms' aggregate demand for skills were repre- 
sented by i2, the new education policy would increase the number of skilled 
laborers by ='. These two examples illustrate the analytical as well as the 
policy-related features of our skills-generation framework. We do not, as is 
common in development modeling, view education solely as a consumer 
durable. Rather, educational outputs can play a productive role in the 
economy; human capital accumulation is important in explaining the process 
of growth and development. The specific way education enters is complex, and 
in our model determined by the interplay of production possibilities, d e m e  
graphic forces, and government education policies. 
2.8 Housing, Land Markets, and Equilibrium Land Use 
There are two competing uses to  which land stocks can be put in our model 
- farming and urban residential land sites. We shall assume that urban residen- 
tial sites implicitly include, in fixed proportion, factor-site requirements as well 
as public land (parks, roads, schools). The fixed proportion assumption will 
simplify the analysis considerably, since we can focus exclusively on  the resi- 
dential site demand component of urban land use. Furthermore, we shall 
assume that "wasteland" exists in the rural area. This wasteland has no com- 
peting use, has no inherent site value, but it can be used for rural housing 
construction. In the real world, of course, wasteland can be and is exploited 
for both urban and farmland expansion through drainage, clearing, and filling. 
These activities involve investment, and t o  confront land accumulation endo- 
genously would require the explicit introduction of urban and rural land- 
supply functions, presumably inelastic t o  capture investment costs, and 
competitive with other investments in housing, training, and physical accumu- 
lation. We ignore such complications and take the expansion of productive 
land R as exogenously given, although not necessarily constant. T o  do  other- 
wise would take us far afield and empirical implementation would be much too 
demanding. 
The stock of productive land in our model is, therefore, defined as 
where urban land sites are utilized for two types of housing - low-cost 
"squatter settlements" (R,,) and high-cost "luxury housing" (R",,). 
The urban housing-market is central to  migration behavior and thus to our 
analysis of the urbanization process. One of the limits on urban growth rates in 
the Third World is the availability (and cost) of urban housing facing new urban 
households, whether the housing is of the informal, labor-intensive, owner- 
occupier type in "squatter settlements" - so typical of rapidly expanding 
Third World cities - or  more substantial dwelling units constructed by 
capital-intensive techniques and rented in a formal housing market. Any 
serious model of urbanization must admit this possible source of "limits to  
urban growth." The "limits" may take various forms, but we shall focus on 
two constraints in particular. 
First, urban rents may rise in the long run due to the inflation of urban 
site rents as in classical urban location theory (Mills, 1972; Henderson, 1977). 
In addition, urban rents may also rise in the short run if investment in new 
structures lags behind demands generated by rapid urban population growth 
(Song and Struyk, 1976; Mills and Song, 1977). Second, to the extent that 
investment in housing responds t o  those demands generated by the 
in-migration, aggregate saving available for "productive" accumulation or 
training will contract and thus the rate of output expansion will suffer 
economy-wide (Coale and Hoover, 1958). Since physical capital and skills are 
used most intensively in the modern sectors (M and KS), the rate of urban 
labor absorption is diminished. In-migration to the cities and urbanization rates 
may slack off as a result. Our model incorporates these forces so that "over- 
urbanization" (Hoselitz, 1955, 1957; Sovani, 1962; Kamerschen, 1969; 
Preston, 1979; Ledent and Rogers, 1979) in our economy may be forestalled. 
As pointed out above, there are two housing types in our model: low-cost 
"squatter settlements" and high-cost "luxury housing." In this we follow the 
United Nations' Habitat (1976, p. 70) where they state: 
In many less developed countries building is characterized by the existence 
of two sectors: a) a multitude of very small enterprises . . . which operate 
in the rural and peri-urban areas, belonging almost entirely to the informal 
sector of the economy; b) a small number of large firms using modern 
techniques and organization, 
and their Global Review of Human Settlements (UN, 1976, p. 11) where 
"squatter settlements": 
. . . generally refer to areas where groups of housing units have been 
constructed on land to which the occupants have no legal claim. In 
many instances housing units located in squatter settlements are shelters 
or structures built of waste materials without a predetermined plan. 
Squatter settlements are usually found . . . at the peripheries of the 
principal cities. 
According to the same source, these squatter settlements are by no means a 
small share of total urban dwellings, but account for the bulk of the growth in 
cities throughout the Third World (see also Mohan, 1979, chp. 1). I t  seems to 
us important to distinguish between two types of urban dwellings, to indicate 
the different sectors that produce them as well as the different socio-economic 
classes that consume the rental services that flow from these residential 
structures. Thus, the quality of housing is denoted by a jth subscript in the 
production functions which follow. 
Urban housing services are produced under constant returns to scale with 
housing structures, H j ,  and land, R ,  j ,  as inputswhile estimates of the elasticity 
of substitution between land and structures in residential-housing production 
functions vary considerably (Muth, 1969, 197 1 ; Arnott and Lewis, 1977; 
Ingram, 1977; Henderson, 1977), the estimates are almost always quite high. 
We shall adopt a Cobb-Douglas specification for urban housing in what follows: 
where a H , j  + a , , ,  = 1, US denotes "squatter settlements," and KS "luxury 
housing." In contrast, rural housing services do  not require the input of land of 
significant site value, so that a fixed coefficient production function is assumed 
to apply: 
H~ s 
Q H , R S  = - 
a ~ ,  R s 
(8) 
This rural-urban asymmetric treatment of housing insures that rising land 
prices and increased site rents will have a disproportionate effect on the cost-of- 
living in urban areas as urbanization proceeds. Perhaps this can be seen more 
clearly when the total rental price for urban housing is written explicitly as 
r a H , j d E R . j  
H, j  P H . ~  = a H j  a R , j '  j = u s ,  K s  
A H , j a H , ~  a ~ , j  
where du is the site rent and rHSj is the structure rent. Of course, the real-estate 
market never decomposes total rental price into these two component parts, 
and in our model all dwellings are owner-occupied. (In Korea, for example, 
94  percent of rural and 83  percent of urban households were owner-occupiers 
in 1975 (Suh, 1979, table 1 1, p. 47).) Nevertheless, it will still prove analyti- 
cally useful to  decompose total rental prices in this fashion. In percentage rates 
of change (denoted by an *), these rental prices are related by 
Land's share, has been estimated t o  be about 0.10 (Muth, 1971 ; see 
also Muth, 1969; Henderson, 1977; and Ingram, 1977). It follows that modest 
increases in urban rental prices may be consistent with dramatic increases in 
urban site rents (called the "magnification effect" in the urban literature). 
Dramatic increases in urban site rents imply equally dramatic increases in urban 
land prices and the latter have become a notable feature of twentieth century 
development even in the Third World. For example, urban land prices in Korea 
have been rising in real terms at 16 percent per annum since the early 1960s. 
(Mills and Song, 1977. For information on the boom of urban land values in the 
Third World, see Woodruff and Brown, 1971, pp. 16-25, chps. 5, 6, and 9. The 
same phenomenon can be found in postwar Japan. See Mills and Ohta, 1976.) 
What, then, determines land rents, land prices, and land use in our model? 
The agricultural production function is Cobb-Douglas. Under competitive 
assumptions, land rents per hectare can be written as 
Alternatively, expression (45) can be written as a derived demand function for 
farmland: 
RA = P A ~ A , R Q A ~ ~ '  
where the derived demand function has an elasticity of - 1. Similarly, the 
urban-housing, Cobb-Douglas production functions imply derived urban land 
demands for residential purposes (recalling that "residential" requirements 
embody commercial, factory, and public site needs). Thus, 
where P i p j  is the net rent received by the owner (imputed, not cash) after 
paying an urban property tax. Since it is not our purpose here t o  determine the 
distribution of urban populations across urban space - as in classic urban 
location theory - nor to  confront the Third World reality that "squatter 
settlements" tend t o  be located at the fringe of the city while "luxury housing" 
tends to  be located nearer the central business district (Mohan, 1977; Ingram 
and Carroll, 1978; Mills and Song, 1977), we shall assume that urban site rents 
are the same for all urban households. Thus, 
Like farmland, these derived demand functions for urban land also have an 
elasticity of - 1. The aggregate derived demand function for urban land is 
simply 
R u  = d;' { P i , u s a ~ , u s Q ~ , u s  + P ~ , K S ~ R , K S Q H . K S }  
Our model is in no way a true spatial framework since distance plays no 
role in either of the two sectors. Thus, farmgate prices do  not rise with greater 
proximity to  urban markets and therefore farmland does not exhibit a "rental 
gradient" reflecting such heterogeneity. Similarly, proximity to  the central 
business district does not offer any of the advantages typically postulated in 
conventional urban location theory (savings in transport costs and commuter 
time). There is, therefore, no urban "rental gradient" implied. Since urban 
land is homogenous in this sense, only the "extramarginal" rent on the fringe 
of the city matters in determining land use. 
Figure 4 supplies the optimal land-use solution under such conditions. 
The equilibrium rent is denoted by d* = du  = dA,  and the optimal land-use mix 
is derived accordingly. What seems interesting to  us is how many central 
rents 
]Farm rents 
Derived demand 
I 
FIGURE 4 The determinants of land rents and optimal land use. 
land-use issues are captured by this simple framework. Three such issues are 
contronted in what follows: 
- Does the model predict rising urban densities over time? 
- Can it account for the dramatic rise in urban land values? 
- Will it produce an encroachment on farmland over time? 
It  is a common theorem of growth theory that factors in relative inelastic 
supply will increase in relative rent (and thus price or  value) unless technology 
tends to  be very factor-saving of the inelastically-supplied input (e.g., Nichols, 
1970). In our model, capital accumulates, skills are augmented through training, 
population growth swells the labor force (and thus residential housing stocks), 
but the stock of land grows exogenously, and presumably at relatively low 
rates. The presumption is that relative rents will rise, over time, unless tech- 
nological change serves t o  save on land. If one focuses only on land for agricul- 
tural use, "technological change" surely does tend t o  save on land, since the 
agricultural sector declines in relative size with successful economic growth. 
On the other hand, our model explicitly introduces an additional land 
use - urban residential-site needs - and since successful economic growth 
implies rapid urbanization, the "land-saving" attributes of the simpler growth 
model are no longer so relevant. Indeed, while our urban housing production 
function specifications include the possibility of extensive substitution of 
structures for land (guaranteeing that urban densities will increase in the face 
of rising land rents), rapid urbanization implies a relatively voracious demand 
for land and the encroachment of farmland at the cities' margins. Additionally, 
there are forces at work in agriculture which will shift outward the derived 
demand for farmland: e.g., the rising price of foodstuffs and the accumulation 
of agricultural capital. In short, we expect the model t o  produce, over time, an 
outward shift in the derived demand for land in both uses, but we also expect 
that the derived demand for urban land will shift outward at a more rapid rate. 
The long-run implications of such derived demand growth can be seen in 
Figure 5, where the following trends should be observed: 
1. Urban and rural rents rise at a rapid rate; 
2. Land use shifts in favor of urban residential use, but the rate of shift 
is choked-off by two forces - the downward sloping character of the 
derived demand for farmland and the tendency for urban housing to 
consume less space as land gets scarcer; 
3. Urban land densities rise. 
All of these attributes are "stylized facts" of urbanization in the Third World.* 
Consider next the determinants of urban land values. In the simplest 
formulation, urban land values can be calculated assuming naive expectations 
regarding the behavior of future rents (i.e., du is expected to  prevail at the 
current rate forever) and assuming infinite life. Thus, 
where i is the economy-wide "discount rate." In the absence of inflation, 
it seems unlikely that i will drift upward over time. This is because since 
This analysis ignores both property and capital-gains taxes. Very few Third World economies utilize 
such taxes, but they may well be introduced in the near future. As a result, we thought it useful to intrck 
duce such tax parameters into the model to allow exploration of their potential impact. The value of 
urban property is 
PHj - r H j V H j  P H j  
VHj  = --  j = US, KS 
i (i + r H  j )  ' ( 1 9 ,  (16) 
or, alternatively, 
P&J V H j  = - 
1 
where PHj  is the (imputed) rent on the jth type of housing - a "demand price," & . is the (imputed) net 
rent after property taxes on site and structure - r "supply price," and TH,J is the *&an property tax rate 
(most likely zero rated on "squatter settlements"). Therefore, 
the "demand price" for housing exceeding the "supply price" by 
~ + T H J  .+l. 
i 
FIGURE 5 Shifts in land's derived demand over time. 
conventional capital will accumulate rapidly over time in the successful Less 
Developed Country (LDC), thus lowering the returns to  "machines" unless 
technology is very capital-using (a distinct possibility with the capital-intensive 
sectors, KS and M, growing relatively rapidly). But the percentage rate of 
return i is related to  the returns t o  machines r by i = r /PM.  Thus, while 
increases in the relative price of urban land should be a characteristic of our 
model, the sources of this increase are more complex than just the expected 
increases in land rents. 
2.9 Balance o f  Payments and the Foreign Trade Sector 
Since there are no monetary variables in our model, the balance of payments 
must always be in equilibrium. We assume, therefore, that the foreign-exchange 
rate is consistent with the balance of payments equilibrium such that the 
external clearing equation is satisfied by 
[ P g M M  +Pz(ZKs + Z M  + Z A ) ]  - [PYXA + F ]  0 (55) 
where PYXA are export earnings, [P,WMM + Pz(ZKs + ZM + ZA )I  are foreign- 
exchange requirements for imports, and F denotes exogenous levels of net 
foreign aid and private capital imports. Equation (55) hides more than it 
reveals and what follows is an elaboration of our implicit assumptions regarding 
trade relationships. 
Our model is a conventional "vent for surplus" paradigm. That is, our 
t I Balanced demand 
FIGURE 6 Dynamic comparative advantage and "vent-for-surplus." 
economy is viewed as a price taker with P z ,  P z ,  and pz all determined in 
world markets.* Given domestic demand and supply conditions, excess supplies 
of the primary product can be "vented" on world markets and excess demands 
for manufactured goods can be satisfied in the same fashion. It should be noted 
that this approach focuses attention exclusively on the net trade of both 
commodity types. The model does not confront gross trade relationships, 
including dynamic changes in the mix of commodity trade within these export 
and import categories. Thus, while the model is fully capable of explaining 
the net impact of dynamic comparative advantage, it cannot deal with any 
tendency toward specialization in the export of labor-intensive consumer goods 
in exchange for more capital-cum-skill intensive producer durables. 
It does seem likely, however, that the observed tendency of comparative 
advantage to  shift specialization from primary products to  manufactured goods 
will be captured by the model. This process of dynamic comparative advantage 
can be seen in the conventional trade diagram in Figure 6, where Po represents 
an initial production mix (i.e., QA and Q M )  and Co an initial domestic con- 
sumption mix (i.e., DA and D M ) .  Relatively rapid capital and skill accumulation, 
compared to unskilled labor and land, as well as unbalanced total-factor pro- 
ductivity growth favoring manufacturing, is likely t o  shift the production 
possibility frontier in such a fashion that (at C ,  and P , )  net dependence on 
* We invoke the "law of one price" here. See, however, Isard, 1976; Kravis and Lipsey, 1977; and Dervis 
and Robinson, 1978. 
exports of primary products will diminish unless domestic demand conditions 
are highly biased toward manufactured goods. Indeed, the model may well yield 
a shift in comparative advantage t o  a net export of  manufactured goods, 
although Figure 6 does not elaborate on this case. 
These trade conditions can be influenced by tariffs, TT,,, and export 
taxes, rT,,. They can also be influenced by the many tax parameters which 
comprise domestic tax policy, including all of those governmental influences 
that affect the mix of demand. Commercial policy would normally take the 
form of raising the price of manufactured goods relative t o  agricultural goods 
in domestic markets; that is, the price line in Figure 6 would be rotated 
counterclockwise. A relative expansion in the production of manufactured 
goods would take place, say at P,. The now cheaper relative price of agricultural 
goods would foster a relative increase in the domestic consumption of agricul- 
tural goods, say a t  C,. Of course world market prices would still prevail. Tariffs 
and export taxes serve, therefore, t o  distort the price between domestic and 
international markets as well as to  generate government revenues. 
Net foreign capital inflows F are given exogenously. This treatment of 
"foreign aid" may, a t  first sight, appear to  be in the tradition of the "two gap" 
literature (Chenery and Strout, 1966), but it actually conforms more readily 
with the revisionist literature which has developed in recent years (Griffen and 
Enos, 1970; Weisskopf, 1972; Papanek, 1973; Heller, 1975; Bhagwati and 
Grinols, 1975; Grinols and Bhagwati, 1976). That literature has pointed out 
that domestic saving appears t o  bear a negative correlation with foreign aid 
levels, implying that the domestic-savings effort is relaxed with the addition of 
foreign aid. Presumably, the "relaxation" of the domesticsavings effort lies 
primarily with the government sector where, it is thought, the tax effort is 
diminished and current expenditures are expanded a t  the expense of govern- 
ment saving. As we shall see in the next section, our model does indeed capture 
such behavioral responses. On the other hand, since the rate of return plays 
no  direct role as an influence on domestic savings in our model, the possibility 
that may "crowd out" private savings (McKinnon, 1973) is ignored. Our 
own view is not that "crowding out" forces are irrelevant, but rather that 
development economists have not yet successfully accounted for their quanti- 
tative influence (see, however, Heller, 1975 ; Ortmeyer, 1979). 
2.10 The Government Sector 
The government has two sources of revenue in our model: endogenously 
determined taxes and exogenous levels of net foreign "aid" and private foreign 
capital, the latter assumed t o  flow through government channels. These 
revenues form the total government budget constraint which is allocated 
between saving (largely construction in irrigation projects, roads, schools, and 
public buildings), but  also including current expenditures in education and 
consumption (largely expenditures on defense and social services). With the 
exception of current education expenditures the empirical counterpart of these 
two spending categories are the government's capital and current budgets, 
respectively. 
The inclusion of education expenditure in government "saving" represents 
a break with the conventional treatment of government in most growth and 
development models. Typically, the government is modeled so that its con- 
sumption does not directly contribute t o  household income or  utility, nor does 
it contribute t o  future output expansion. While this is a useful abstraction for 
some purposes, especially given the difficulty of valuing and allocating public 
goods t o  consuming units, it will not suffice in our model. In particular, 
education expenditures may well yield consumption utility to  its recipients, 
but in our model they have an impact on future income as well. This reality is 
explicitly incorporated in our model since skills are produced by training 
investment and these compete with alternative modes of accumulation. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, to  include this category of government expenditure as 
saving. While other categories of government expenditure might also qualify 
(e.g., health expenditures), our approach can be considered as, at least, a partial 
rectification of an anti-growth bias attributed t o  government in most develop- 
ment models. 
All government final demands are produced by the capital-cum-skill 
intensive KS service sector, and government demand dominates this sector's 
total output. We make no distinction between governmental and privately 
owned and operated enterprises, focusing instead on the demand characteristics 
of government activities. 
Taxes come from a wide range of sources. These include: 
1. taxes on households' consumption of M sector goods, 
2. taxes (or subsidies) on agricultural intermediate inputs purchased 
from manufacturing, 
3. taxes on urban property (including housing), 
4. taxes on enterprise income (net of depreciation allowances) in the 
M and KS sectors, 
?n,M IrM -&MPM 1 K~ + 7 n . ~ ~ [ r ~ ~  - 6KSPM 1 K~~ 
5. taxes on distributed profits, 
6. taxes on rental income in agriculture, 
7. taxes on skilled labor's income, 
8. taxes on foreign trade, 
TT,M [%MM 1 f T T , X  [FA X A  1. 
For the most part the tax specification is straightforward, but tariffs and 
export taxes could pose some technical difficulties. Treating import tariffs and 
export subsidies as ad valorem rates, the tax revenue is T T , M  [ p E M M  I + 
T ~ , ~  [ & X A ] .  AS we pointed out in the previous section, however, our model 
examines net imports of manufactured goods M M  and net exports of primary 
products X A ,  a feature common to  this type of model where the composition of 
imports and exports is suppressed. Since the composition of imports and 
exports shifts systematically as economic development takes place, and since 
net imports of manufactured goods decline through import substitution (with 
perhaps the country even becoming a net exporter of this commodity), a tax 
function based on net trade flows could yield inappropriate estimates of 
revenues derived from international trade. However, this is unlikely t o  be a 
problem with our "representative country" which, over a period of 20 t o  40 
years, remains, on average, a net importer of manufactured goods and a net 
exporter of agricultural commodities. 
The government tax-revenue function can now be summarized in 
equation (56): 
This tax function exhibits an urban bias, a feature documented in surveys 
of fiscal finance in low-income countries. Only labor income of the relatively 
high-paid urban skilled worker is taxed; in addition, the income of capitalists 
and landlords, who are assumed to  be largely located in cities, is also subject t o  
income taxes. While in some countries lower income workers have been taxed, 
the yield has typically been small, due to  low tax rates, tax evasion, and high 
costs of administration. This form of taxation is, therefore, omitted from our 
specification. The urban bias is also evident given our treatment of commodity 
taxation of manufactured goods, as well as the tax on urban residential property. 
Another characteristic of the tax function is its apparent high elasticity 
with respect to  the Gross National Product (GNP) and the attributes of struc- 
tural change that accompany economic growth: an increase in the share of 
manufactured goods in total household expenditures, a rising share of modern- 
sector output, a shift of the labor force into higher-skilled occupations, and an 
increasing inequality in the distribution of income in the early to  intermediate 
stages of economic development. A rising share of taxes and government 
spending in GNP is a likely outcome from our model, and such patterns would 
conform to  empirical results obtained in several studies (Bird, 1976; Bolnick, 
1978; Chelliah, 197 1 ; Chelliah, Bass, and Kelly, 1975). 
One qualification of the tax function is in order. While the profits of the 
KS sector are taxed, a major portion of this sector produces government goods 
and services. This is a mixed public-private sector, a reality captured in the 
model by specifying lower "corporate" tax and payout rates in the KS than in 
the M sector, i.e., T ~ , ~ ~  < T ~ , ~  and $ K S  < $ M .  
Unlike most general equilibrium models (but see Heller, 1975), government 
spending is not exogenously given in our model. Such a hypothesis would not 
only be at variance with the empirical literature (Gandhi, 197 1; Kelley, 1973, 
1976a; Thorn, 1967), but is also unappealing for a model that accounts for the 
sources of growth and structural change in the long run. The present model 
attempts, albeit in a highly simplified fashion, t o  capture aspects of government 
spending over time by appealing to  the same forces that determine private con- 
sumption and saving behavior. The government is assumed to allocate its budget 
to saving, G s ,  in response t o  increments in the resources available to  it from 
taxes and foreign sources, and in response t o  demographic and urban pressures 
- by assumption, the main source of public investment demands. Thus, 
We anticipated that the government's marginal propensity t o  save, PC, 
would exceed that of the private sector, based on the literature accumulated 
t o  date on this issue (Mikesell and Zinser, 1973; Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1967; 
Williamson, 1979). We also expected, contrary to the Coale and Hoover (1958) 
hypothesis, that public saving would be positively related to  increasing urban 
populations, y, > 0. Some analysts, like Michael Lipton (1976), would view 
this prediction as an accurate reflection of the realities of the "urban bias in 
world development." A pooled sample of "representative" Third World 
economies covering the 1960s and early 1970s confirms both expectations. 
Indeed, p, and j., are estimated as 0.334(9.19) and 0.484(4.06), respectively 
(t-statistics in parentheses). This result is not conditional on our definition of 
saving since similar results are forthcoming when expenditures on education are 
excluded from government saving, altnough both 0, and j., are somewhat 
lower when Gs  is defined to  exclude educational expenditures. 
Finally, since OG < 1, changes in the levels of foreign aid do  not augment 
the domestic saving pool by an equal amount, but by only 0, .dF. This places 
us squarely in the "revisionist" foreign aid camp discussed in Section 2.9. 
2.1 1 Household Demand, Saving, and Migrant Remittances 
One of the ironies of the development planning literature is the relative paucity 
of investigations of the role of demand in the process of growth and structural 
change. By this we mean that there are few models that admit prices as an 
influence on demand, and that simultaneously permit demand to influence 
prices.* While the incorporation of Engel effects provides a first approximation, 
such demand influences do not adequately capture the systematic influence of 
price as development takes place. We agree with Lluch, Powell, and Williams 
(1977) who note: 
. . . the bulk of models of economic development have been based on the 
assumption that commodity prices are of little or no significance in deter- 
mining the crucial aspects of economic behavior. The oil crises may or 
may not constitute a convincing rebuttal of this proposition, but investi- 
gation of the role of prices remains high on the list of priorities in 
economic development modeling. Prices cannot be investigated meaning- 
fully without also examining the structure of demand. (p. xxn.) 
To  explore the issues surrounding the role of demand in economic 
development, we have selected the Extended Linear Expenditure System 
(ELES), recently elaborated and empirically investigated by Lluch, Powell, and 
Williams (1977). The ELES framework captures most of the stylized demand 
facts associated with modern economic growth in the Third World. In 
particular it: 
1. captures Engel effects; 
2. incorporates dualistic elements in demand behavior across regions 
and socioeconomic classes; 
3.  provides an important role for demographic influences; 
4. offers explicit empirical content to  the concept of "subsistence" in 
the low-income societies. 
Equally important, the framework can be derived from reasonable postulates 
of behavior (Goldberger, 1967; Brown and Deaton, 1972; Howe, 1975) and 
satisfies the "adding up" property conlmon to  several modern integrated 
* This is becoming less true with the recent proliferation of computable general equlibrium models, 
primarily produced by World Bank economists and consultants. See, for example, Lysy and Taylor, 1977; 
Blitzer, Clark, and Taylor, 1975; and the recent large-scale model by Adelman and Robinson, 1978. It still 
remains true of economic-demographic models. 
demand systems. Its only serious competitor is the direct addilog system first 
developed by Frisch (1959) and extended by Houthakker (1960) and Sato 
(1972). The ELES has the advantage, however, of having been estimated with 
data for Third World economies underlying our "representative economy" 
model. 
In its simplest form, the extended linear expenditure system assumes that 
the household allocates its disposable income ( *) between various commodities 
( q l , .  . . , qn)  and savings where prices (p,, . . . , p n )  are exogenous to  the 
household, and saving is the difference between total income and the sum of all 
commodity expenditures (y* - c, where c = C piqi = C vi). The model further 
assumes that the household's utility function is such that each commodity 
potentially possesses a "minimum subsistence demand" (yi 2 0) which must be 
fulfilled before the remaining "supernumerary" income (y* - C piyi) is allo- 
cated at the margin between the various commodities and saving. This paradigm 
of household saving and spending is represented by the expenditure equations 
sj  = yt-  c.  
I I I 
A graphical presentation of the ELES for the two-commodity case is 
provided in Figure 7. Based on utility function u(ql,  q,), and assuming q i  > yi, 
the household's expenditure and savings allocations follow directly: for q , , y,  
represents subsistence needs, B - y1 is supernumerary expenditure on this 
commodity, and saving is measured by the value of q ,  not consumed, Sip,. 
An analogous accounting holds for q,. Such a representation highlights the role 
of prices in saving-expenditure allocation decisions, a feature captured in our 
general equilibrium model which utilizes the ELES. By rotating the three 
parallel lines, alternative prices would prevail; these would elicit quite different 
allocations between qi and s. 
The ELES is similar t o  the more familiar Linear Expenditure System 
(LES), with one notable difference: in the extended system, total consumption 
out of disposable income is determined endogenously. Thus. the sum of the 
marginal budget shares and savings exhausts disposable income. In the LES, the 
sum of the marginal budget shares exhausts total expenditure.* The ELES thus 
does not utilize the strong separability assumption between saving and expendi- 
ture embedded in the LES, but rather views the household as determining its 
* The LES is therefore a subset of the ELES, where saving is determined exogenously. To see this. sum 
the expenditure equations in (61) to obtain c = (1 -r) Z p ~ f l  + PY*, where p = Z Pi. By obtaining an 
expression fory * in terms of c, and substituting into (61), the more familiar LES results, 
vi = p ~ f i  + ii(c - C p ~ f ~ ) ,  where P^ i = Pil~ 
FIGURE 7 The two-commodity case of ELES. 
expenditure allocation simultaneously with its total consumption decision, an 
appealing premise. 
The ELES implies a Keynesian saving specification except that super- 
numeraly disposable income is the determinant of household saving, not 
disposable income. While a savings specification which took account of rates of 
return and asset portfolio preferences would be desirable, it is too complex to 
incorporate into this version of our basic model and, in any case, debate still 
continues over the appropriate empirical characterization of interest elasticities 
in household saving functions. Yet, our savings specification does respond to 
the appeal by Mikesell and Zinser (1 973) who, in their survey of the literature 
for developing countries, urge the exploration of savings behavior of various 
types of households. Compositional influences will be captured in our frame- 
work to the extent that there may be a shift in the distribution of income to 
higher-saving households as economic development takes place. 
Our savings specification also permits commodity prices to  influence 
saving. Based on ELES estimates of saving and expenditure allocation for 17 
countries, Lluch, Powell, and Williams (1977) found that for low ranges of 
per capita income, a 1 percent rise in the price of food will elicit a 1.8 percent 
decline in the saving rate (p. xxv). If this quantitative result has general 
validity, then omitting prices from the saving decision, as would be implied 
by household systems based on the strong separability assumption, may 
provide quite misleading results concerning the role of demand in economic 
development. 
The treatment of "subsistence" consumption is a particularly interesting 
feature of the ELES. The concept has many interpretations in the economic 
development literature, ranging from the "biological-requirements-for-survival" 
notion in early dualistic models (Jorgenson, 1967), t o  the recent policy discus- 
sions relating to  "basic needs," a set of socially desired minimum consumption 
standards (Srinivasan, 1977; Streeten and Burki, 1978; Hopkins and Norbye. 
1978). The ELES demand system provides an interpretation of subsistence 
which lies between these two extremes. In particular, the yi's are determined 
by the household's own preferences and thus represent an aggregation of 
biological requirements, individual preferences, and social norms. The com- 
position of the -yi7s, as well as their aggregate sue, may vary across individuals 
in society. While our model will treat the -yi's as parameters constant to a 
household type, subsistence demand may change over time, due, in part, to  
shifts in the distribution of income across households. The -yi's have particular 
relevance, therefore, to  interpreting the consequences of specific types of 
incomeexpenditure distribution policies in the low-income country. 
Recent empirical investigations of the ELES utilizing micro-economic data 
from Mexico, Korea, Chile, Yugoslavia, and several Latin American cities 
(Lluch, Powell, and Williams, 1977) have established differences in household 
demand behavior related to  selected demographic characteristics, location 
(largely urban and rural), and socioeconomic class, even after controlling for 
the level of household income. Based on this and similar findings (Kelley and 
Williamson, 1968; Kelley, 1969, 1976b; Blitzer, Clark, and Taylor, 1975; 
Betancourt, 1979), we have elected to  disaggregate our households into several 
categories: urban and rural, on the one hand, and skilled labor, unskilled labor, 
and property income recipients on the other. This will permit the investigation 
of the role of demand through systematic changes in the composition of house- 
holds as development takes place, and in particular, the impact of urbanization, 
changing income distribution, and skill accumulation. The possibility that we 
will be able to  assess the role of household final demand effects, adjusted to  
indirect derived demands originating through the interindustry structure, 
represents an interesting feature of the model. We should be able to  provide at 
least one empirically relevant test of the competing hypothesis concerning the 
relative importance of demand variations, versus supply changes operating 
through technical change and resource availabilities, on the patterns and rates 
of economic change. (See Chenery, 1960; Kuznets, 1957, 1966; Clark, 1957; 
Chenery and Syrquin, 1975.) 
A full statement of  the household demand system, as well as statements 
summarizing their aggregation into final demand categories corresponding to 
our model's production structure, is provided in the appendix as equations 
(59)-(62). Each household's demand statement, irrespective of location or 
socioeconomic class, possesses the form presented above in equation (59). 
In addition the appendix provides a side equation (60) for the cost of living 
relevant to various types of households. This statistic will be important in 
assessing the impact of economic policies on various aspects of household 
welfare, especially those policies relating to  income distribution and migration. 
Finally, it should be noted that incomes (except for property income 
recipients) are adjusted t o  take into account the intersectoral flow of migrants' 
remittances, TRF. (See equation (61) in the appendix.) These transfers are 
generally believed to  be large, and Johnson and Whitelaw (1974) have con- 
firmed that belief, at  least on Kenyan data. Based on these results, we specify 
the transfers to  rural households to  be a fixed share of income, T :  
TRFI,L = T ( w i , ~ ) ,  i = US, M, KS (63)-(65) 
TRFi,s = T[( l  - T ~ ) w ~ , ~ ] ,  i = KS, M (66), (67) 
That share is almost surely a function of length of time since the remitting 
household migrated t o  the city, but we have had no success in securing esti- 
mates on such parameters. In any case, these transfers play a potentially 
important role in our model in two ways: first, they have welfare implications; 
second, they may have a significant impact on  the structure of private con- 
sumption demand, saving, and irivestment allocation. 
2.12 Housing Investment and Aggregate Saving 
Aggregate saving determines accumulation possibilities in our model, and this 
savings pool is generated by three sources: retained after-tax corporate and 
enterprise profits, government saving, and household saving. (Foreign saving 
serves t o  augment government resources and thus indirectly appears as a 
component of government saving.) These three sources can be written as 
SAVINGS = (1 - $,)[(I -7,,M)(rM -~MPM)KMI + 6MPMKM 
+ (1 - $KS)[(l -TII,KS)(~KS -6KSpM)KKSl 
+ 6KSPMKKS + SUSLUS + SMLM + SKSLKS 
1 (961 
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where all parameters and variables have been previously defined. 
There are three competing demands on this savings pool: investment in 
physical ("productive") capital, investment in human capital (training), and 
investment in ("unproductive") housing. Following the conventional emphasis 
in the development literature, physical capital accumulation is written as a 
residual in equation (97) 
PM IM = SAVINGS HOUSING - TRAINING COSTS (97) 
but it should be emphasized that these three modes of accumulation are deter- 
mined simultaneously and in competition. Investment allocation rules dictating 
the intersectoral allocation of pM IM between agriculture, manufacturing, and 
the KS sector were discussed in Section 2.6; the determinants of training 
investment levels were described in Section 2.7. This section will focus on  
housing investment demand under imperfect capital markets. I t  will then con- 
clude with a summary of the mechanism which dictates overall investment 
allocation in the model. 
Following Coale and Hoover (1958), our model distinguishes between 
"productive" and "unproductive" investment. Unproductive investment is 
captured by housing requirements, a component which is sensitive to  d e m e  
graphic and urbanization forces. Furthermore, housing investment is viewed 
in much the same way that subsistence consumption requirements are treated 
in the consumer demand system. This is, private households behave in a fashion 
such that housing needs receive first priority in their investment portfolios. 
Only after these investment needs are satisfied d o  households release their 
residual savings for "productive" accumulation purposes, through banks, 
nonbank financial institutions, and informal "curb" markets. This character- 
ization is motivated by McKinnon's (1973) emphasis on "financial market 
fragmentation." 
Since the formal mortgage market is poorly developed or nonexistent in 
much of the Third World, we have assumed that none of the three private 
housing sectors (rural, urban "squatter settlements," urban "luxury housing") 
are able to  secure external finance to  satisfy investment requirements. Housing 
investment is, therefore, self-financed by each household sector independent 
of other surplus-generating sectors. While this specification eliminates the 
possibility of intersectoral housing financial flows, it does not exclude the 
possibility of intrasectoral housing financial flows. For example, fathers may 
loan t o  sons, but "middle-class" skilled households cannot loan t o  poor 
"unskilled" households. Certain sectors may, therefore, be starved for housing 
finance while others have a surplus which they allocate t o  the national saving 
pool for "productive" accumulation or training investment. 
Under conditions of rapid population growth, it is quite possible that 
household savings will be fully exhausted by housing investment requirements. 
This potential demographic burden is reinforced in our model by rapid rates 
of urbanization. This follows from the fact that housing is location-specific; 
thus, migration of even a stable aggregate population requires new housing 
construction in the receiving regions, and net investment economy-wide. 
Furthermore, given the cost-of-living adjustment embedded in the model's 
migration function, rapid in-migration and urbanization may well be forestalled 
by the urban housing requirements that these population movements imply. 
An urban housing investment shortfall will result in a rise in urban rents, 
thereby attenuating in-migration. Alternatively, increased urban housing 
investment serves to inhibit the accumulation of "productive" capital, and we 
know that the rate of productive capital accumulation is a central determinant 
of the relative expansion of employment in the modern sectors. 
This treatment illustrates the importance of general equilibrium paradigms 
in accounting for the sources of growth and structural change. Consider the 
analysis of intersectoral migration. The benefits of migration in reallocating 
labor to its highest productivity will be partially offset in our model by the 
costs resulting from the diversion of "productive" investment funds to  "unpro- 
ductive" urban housing. The rate of urbanization will tend to diminish as a 
result. A similar impact results from rising urban housing rental prices. Thus, 
rapid rates of urbanization will trigger endogenous forces tending to suppress 
"over-urbanization", a result which may provide a very different character- 
ization of intersectoral labor transfers than would be forthcoming from partial 
equilibrium demographic estimates of urban change. Projections of city popu- 
lations exceeding 30 million (UN, 1976) are likely to  merit serious qualification 
in the face of economic adjustments like those contained in our model. Only 
general equilibrium modeling of the sort contained in our housing-cum- 
migration specification can capture the various countelvailing forces associated 
with urbanization, economic growth, and structural change. 
What remains is t o  convert these qualitative descriptions of investment 
demand in housing under capital market fragmentation into explicit quantifi- 
able equations. At given prices and incomes, we specify the following type of 
urban housing investment demand equation: 
IH,j = Min {s jLjPyl ,  + 6 H , j H j ) ,  
I H . ~  = {o? I H , ~ } ,  
where sjLjP,T1 is the saving generated by households consuming the jth type of 
housing (deflated by Pi and thus converted into housing investment quantities), 
is net investment in housing, and IHSj  is gross investment in housing. The 
first expression simply states that household saving in sector j may be binding 
on housing investment in that sector. If not, dwelling investment will not 
exhaust the sector's household saving and a surplus will be available for 
accumulation in other forms. Our expectation is that rural households will 
consistently have a surplus available for accumulation in other forms in spite 
of a low per capita income. This may also hold for the urban skilled and 
property income recipient classes, but is less likely for the urban unskilled 
household sector. The second expression given above simply states that gross 
investment cannot be negative. This expression is unlikely to  be binding under 
conditions of rapid population growth, even with substantial rural out- 
migration rates. Depreciation requirements are given by aHSjHj .  
In discussing the determinants of net investment, I$,j,  it will be helpful 
to  define the following terms, some of which are new while others are added 
to  refresh the reader's memory: 
i H , j  = an index of profitability of housing investment in the jth hous- 
ing stock, a "benefit-cost" ratio computed as the ratio of the 
discounted stream of net rents t o  current construction costs; 
FIGURE 8 Housing investment response to own (shadow) rates of return. 
Pj = per unit construction costs of Hi; 
r ~ , i  = per unit "structure rent" on Hj (a shadow price since owner- 
occupied status is assumed, and thus rents are fully flexible with 
no  market stickiness); 
i = the discount rate, or  average rate of return on physical capital 
economy-wide ; 
PHOj = total rental price, including both the site and structure rental 
components. 
Using these definitions, net investment in housing in the jth sector is written as 
rE,j = dH,j[FLy - 11 
where iHSj is the index of investment profitability: 
fHOj = [(rHVj - 8H,j4)i-1] PI:', j = US, KS, R S  (79)-(8 1) 
High values of FH, indicate high profitability with positive paps between 
capitalized anticipated net rents and current construction costs.* This expres- 
sion also states that net investment in housing should be zero when the benefit- 
cost ratio is unity, that is, where the economy-wide percentage rate of return 
equals the rate of return on sector j's new housing investment. Higher values of 
iHVj imply more housing investment at  the expense of alternative investment 
elsewhere in the economy. 
It  should be apparent from Figure 8 that net investment in housing can 
take on negative values as the benefit-cost ratio falls below unity, but since gross 
* We assume naive expectations and s m i t e  life here for simplicity. Furthermore, EH is taken to be 
common to all types of housing investment. 
investment is restricted to non-negative values, a limit on the size of the 
negative values of net housing investment is implied as 
N 
= e H V j [ i L : .  - 11 > - S H , j H j  
The previous expression simply postulates that new housing investment is 
responsive to profitability in a nonlinear way as in Figure 8. 
The housing investment demand equations for all three sectors can now be 
written formally as 
and 
and 
I H , K S  = Min{[ssS + scClPi&,  IE ,Ks  + S H , K S H K S )  
I H , K S  = Max{O, I H , K S )  (78) 
G , K s  = e H , K s [ G H K s  - 1 J 
As equations (79)-(81) reveal, structure rents are central to  the determin- 
ation of i H B j .  Given Cobb-Douglas housing-service production functions 
(Section 2.8), urban structure rents are 
A pS 2 H . i  a R , i  
= I H.j H,i  H.i a ~ , i  ' H , i  d:,:.j , i = US, KS (82), (83) 
Recall that rHSj is a shadow price since all housing is owner-occupied in our 
model. Note, too, the presence of P i p j  in the expression for r H S j .  It is the total 
rental price after urban residential property taxes have been assessed and paid. 
(See equations (17) and (18) and the discussion in Section 2.8.) Since 
"wasteland" has no value in rural areas and since we assume the absence of 
rural property taxes, rural rents implied by the fixed coefficient production 
function are 
- 
~ H . R S  - P H , R S ~ H , R S - '  (84) 
Finally, EH is an unknown parameter in (76)-(78), but we shall experiment 
with alternative values. 
There are three sectors involved in housing construction in our model. 
I H S R s  represents rural dwellings produced by the informal R S  sector, perhaps 
even constructed by the occupying household itself and with "waste" materials. 
I H , U S  represents similar low-cost urban dwellings ("shanty" housing or  
"squatter settlements") produced by the informal labor-intensive US sector, 
also perhaps even constructed by the occupying household itself. I H S K s  denotes 
highcost housing, produced by the formal construction sector, which, as part 
of KS activities, is relatively capital and skill intensive, and generates inter- 
mediate input demands in the primary product and manufacturing sectors. 
When these housing-investment requirements are valued by current construc- 
tion costs, Pi, total investment demand for housing is obtained in value terms: 
I t  might be helpful t o  summarize saving, accumulation, and capital-goods 
sector activity a t  this point. In terms of the majority of computable general 
equilibrium models, ours is unusual in its treatment of accumulation. There is 
not just one mode of accumulation, but  rather there are three (skills, physical 
capital, and housing). There is not just one capital-goods sector, but rather four 
(KS producing skills; RS, US, and K S  constructing dwellings; and M producing 
physical capital goods). Since each of these capital-goods producing sectors is 
characterized by quite different factor-intensities, changes in the mix of accumu- 
lation over time can have important implications for the structure of output,  
price patterns, and the derived demands for inputs. This distinguishes our 
model from the tradition that has flowed from Uzawa's classic contributions. 
Uzawa (1 96  1, 1963) found that a sufficient condition for uniqueness of 
the static equilibrium was that the consumption-goods sector be more capital 
intensive than the capital-goods sector. While Gordon (1 96  1) has suggested 
that this assumption may not be unreasonable for higher-income economies, 
it appears artificial when applied t o  less developed societies. I t  seems t o  us 
more appropriate, in any case, t o  stress that factor-intensity even in the static 
model is endogenous and conditional upon the direction which the economy- 
wide portfolio mix takes. Shifts in favor of skills investment imply skill- 
intensive capital-goods activity (increasingly KS-oriented); shifts favoring 
conventional physical capital accumulation imply capital-intensive capital 
goods activity (increasingly M-oriented); shifts favoring low-cost housing imply 
labor-intensive capital-goods activity (increasingly RS- and US-oriented). These 
forces have potentially important implications for the distribution of income. 
Note, too, that the three modes of accumulation are explicitly competi- 
tive. Skills accumulation takes place up t o  the point where rates of return are 
equated t o  the economy-wide rate o n  physical capital accumulation. Physical 
capital goods are allocated across the three capital-using sectors so as t o  
minimize rate of return differentials. Dwelling investment will utilize household 
saving only up t o  the point where rates of return are equated t o  the economy- 
wide rate on physical capital accumulation. Of course, there are institutional 
and technological features which seriously restrict the economy's ability t o  
equate rates of return a t  the margin. Any of the three dwelling markets (rural, 
urban "squatter settlements" and formal urban "luxury") may be starved for 
funds since the absence of an intersectoral mortgage market may leave housing 
investment requirements in excess demand. The immobility of physical capital 
stocks between sectors makes it possible that current physical investment 
allocations are insufficient to  equalize rates of return to  capital between A ,  M, 
and KS. Indeed, the larger are housing requirements, the smaller is the residual 
pool available for physical capital accumulation and the more likely that cur- 
rent investment allocations are insufficient to equalize sectoral rates of return. 
Furthermore, firms' demands for skills may be unsatisfied if the stock of 
"potential trainables" is insufficient t o  meet training investment levels which 
would equalize rates of return economy-wide. In short, capital market 
disequilibrium may well be a permanent attribute of our economy. 
2.13 Dynamics: Physical Accumulation, Land Growth, and Technological 
Progress 
Current net investment is equal to total gross investment minus depreciation, 
where depreciation is taken to be proportional to  the capital stock. Thus, 
aggregate "productive" physical capital stocks and "unproductive" housing 
stocks are given by 
Ki = (1 - ai)Ki(- 1) + ZiPM(- l) ,  i = A , M ,  KS (107)-(109) 
H, = 1 - H , j ) H j (  1 + 1 , -  I )  j = US, RS, KS (1 10)-(112) 
where the depreciation rates are allowed to vary not only between productive 
capital (containing equipment of shorter life) and housing (containing struc- 
tures only), but also between housing of different types (luxury housing 
presumably having the longer life). Land is assumed to grow at a fixed exogen- 
ous rate. 
As stated in Section 2.2, factor-augmenting and disembodied technical 
progress are both present in our model. The factor-augmenting rates are given 
exogenously by 
x = x(- 1) eAK (1 13) 
while the disembodied rates (assumed to be zero in rural housing and in both 
informal service sectors) are given by 
= A ~ ( -  1) e"', i = M, KS, A (1 16)-(118) 
While these propositions appear somewhat arbitrary at first glance, in 
reality they are consistent with important "stylized facts" regarding the factor- 
saving bias of technical progress, the unbalanced rate of technical progress 
across sectors, and the economy-wide rate of total-factor productivity growth. 
The first two of these attributes of technical progress - factor-saving bias and 
unbalanced total-factor productivity growth - have become key developmental 
stylized facts and they are central to  debate over economic growth and distri- 
bution in the Third World. As a result, they require considerable elaboration. 
The output-raising effect of technical change has come to be known in the 
literature as total-fact05 productivity growth. These sectoral rates of total-factor 
productivity growth, T,(t), define the percentage rise in output, given fixed 
Total-factor productivity growth rates can be written for each of our eight 
sectors as 1 
TA = XA + ~ A , K X K  + ~ A . L ~ L  
* 
T M ( ~ )  = AM + ~ M , K ( ~ ) X K  + ~ M , L ( ~ ) X L  + ~ M , s ( ~ ) X S  
where the a,,] are output elasticities or factor payment shares. In agriculture, 
the aiSj have no time subscripts because the production function is Cobb- 
Douglas and output elasticities are constant. Furthermore, land is absent there 
since, by assumption, land does not enjoy augmentation through technical 
progress. 
Both modern sectors exhibit variable output shares over time because the 
CES production functions yield such variability as long as modern-sector inputs 
grow at different rates. The traditional labor-intensive service sectors have the 
unskilled labor augmentation rate multiplied by ai since diminishing returns 
prevail there (e.g., ai < 1). The housing sectors are restricted to  constant 
disembodied rates, and the empirical evidence may well warrant our setting 
= 0 for all sectors, not just rural housing. 
These expressions make it possible for sectoral rates o t  total-factor 
productivity growth t o  diverge, a result we shall label unbalanced productivity 
advance. There seems t o  be general agreement in the literature (Kendrick, 1961, 
1973; Uneo and Kinoshita, 1968; Watanabe, 1968; Massel, 196 1 ; Baumol, 
1967) that the modern sectors exhibit the most rapid total-factor productivity 
growth, with agriculture lagging behind in spite of "Green Revolutions" and 
with traditional services almost stagnant. Our model is fully capable of repli- 
cating unbalanced productivity advance of this sort. However, even better 
documentation is available for the overall rate of total-factor productivity 
growth for Third World economies (for recent estimates, see Christensen and 
Cummings, 1974; Elias, 1978; Levy, 1978; Colosio, 1979) and this aggregate 
rate can be written as 
where wi (t) represents sectoral value added shares in GNP. 
It should be apparent that this economy-wide rate need not  be constant 
over time, even with all the A's in equations (1 1 3 t  (1 20) held constant. 
Indeed, economy-wide, total-factor productivitx growth has two parts, both of 
which are endogenous. The first part, Ciwi(t)T,(t), is known in the literature 
as intraindusty total-factor productivity growth. Given unbalanced total-factor 
productivity growth, those sectors with the favored rates tend t o  undergo the 
most dramatic decline in supply price and therefore tend t o  enjoy relative 
output expansion. I t  foliows (under price-elastic demand conditipns) that 
sectors with the highest Ti(t) tend t o  enjoy rising w's over time. T tends t o  
rise over time as a result; 
The second part, TRA(t),  is known in the literature as interindustry total- 
factor productivity growth. Interindustry total-factor productivity growth 
results from improved resource allocation between sectors, a source of growth 
of which much has been made in the development literature. Central t o  the 
labor surplus model, for example, is the premise that institutional factors tend 
t o  produce a gap in labor's marginal product between traditional agriculture 
and modern industry (Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 196 1). Labor migration and 
labor absorption, therefore, tend to  create economy-wide productivity gains 
as resources are allocated t o  uses of hlgher marginal productivity. Suppose we 
denote the relative share of interindustry total-factor productivity growth in 
the aggregate rate by the variable z .  Then 
What d o  we know about the size of z? Clearly, it is a function of factor-market 
disequilibrium since the initial size of the discrepancies between sectoral 
marginal productivities influences the magnitude of the gains from improved 
resource allocation. I t  is also a function of the speed of resource reallocation, 
and the latter is very much constrained by the rate of accumulation in both 
the real world and in our model. 
In other words, the economy-wide totai-factor-productivity growth rate 
in our model is partially embodied. (For a similar argument with a somewhat 
different model, see Kelley and Williamson, 1973.) Edward Denison (1 967, 
1974; Denison and Chung, 1976) has offered estimates of z for advanced 
economies in the post-World War I1 period, but we would expect z t o  be larger 
in the Third World where the rate of structural change is more dramatic and, 
presumably, the initial factor-market disequilibria are greater. Estimates from 
Asia (Ezaki, 1975) and Latin America (Colosio, 1979) suggest that z may lie 
between a third t o  a half of T(t). 
Factor-saving can take two forms. First, a shift in the output  mix may 
favor one or  a group of inputs a t  the expense of others. For  example, the 
expansion of the manufacturing sector will tend t o  increase demands for the 
two inputs used relatively intensively there, capital and skills. In other words, 
unskilled labor is "saved" economy-wide by this shift in output.  Such "com- 
positional" effects are likely t o  have important implications for income distri- 
bution, causing a relative decline in the unskilled wage and concomitant 
inequality trends. T o  the extent that  such compositional changes are induced 
by the character of technical change itself, they can be classified unambiguously 
as factor-saving technological progress. Unbalanced rates of total-factor 
productivity growth favoring the capital-cum-skill intensive sectors, thus 
inducing a shift in output  t o  those sectors enjoying the relatively rapid rates 
of cost reduction, would be exactly the kind of technical progress yielding 
that  result. 
The second form of factor-saving technological progress can be analyzed 
conveniently in terms of the Hicksian concept of neutrality. Technical progress 
is neutral if it leaves the capital-labor ratio unaltered a t  a constant ratio of 
factor prices. The Hicksian factor-saving bias, Bi( t ) ,  is defined t o  be the pro- 
portionate rate of change in the marginal rate of factor substitution in tha t  
sector. In  the simple two-factor case, 
where Fk and F i  are the marginal vroducts of capital and labor, resvectively. 
For  any given capital-labor ratio in the ith sector a t  time t ,  technical progress 
is labor-saving in the Hicksian sense if Bi( t )  > 0. I t  can be shown that the bias 
can also be written as 
Thus, the bias depends on the difference between the rates of factor augrnen- 
tation through technical change and o n  the elasticity of factor substitution. 
There is accumulating empirical evidence supporting the view that  
technological progress in the modern sector is non-neutral. Indeed, this has 
become one of the stylized facts of contemporary development in the Third 
World. (For  a review see Morawetz, 1974; Cline, 1975; and the following 
econometric studies: David and Van d e  Klundert, 1965; Williamson, 1971a; 
Binswanger, 1974; Levy, 1978.) There is n o  need t o  review the explanations 
of the labor-saving bias in modern sectors in the Third World, but  the bias has 
explicit implications for factor augmentation rates through technical change in 
our model. Since elasticities of substitution are less than unity in both the 
manufacturing and the modern-service sector, it follows that labor-saving can 
be captured by the restriction hL, > h K .  This restriction also implies another 
aspect of technological dualism thought to  be relevant in the Third World. 
Namely, while labor-saving is typical of the modern sectors, it is not character- 
istic of traditional activities. The model is fully consistent with this asymmetry 
since, for example, the Cobb-Douglas production function in agriculture 
implies B( t )  = 0. 
In short, our  model appears t o  capture the two central attrihiltes of 
technical progress thvught to  be stylized facts in the Third World: it can deal 
effectively with both unbalanced as well as labor-saving productivity advance. 
It also offers an endogenous treatment of economy-wide total-factor produc- 
tivity advance. 
2.14 Dynamics: Demographic Change and Labor Force Growth 
Advances in demographic techniques and Third World demographic data make 
the elaboration of the model's labor supply specification feasible and attractive. 
Given the initial regional distribution of labor consistent with short-run equi- 
librium in the economic model, given a percentage agesex-region distribution 
of the total population in the initial period, and given agesex-region labor 
force participation rates we can readily determine the population distribution 
by age, sex, and location consistent with the labor-force distributions in short- 
run equilibrium. Given additional information on mortality and fertility rates 
by region, this population stock can then be augmented in the next period. 
Applying the constant age-sex-region specific labor participation rates to  these 
new population stocks, the demographic model will yield the necessary labor- 
force stocks to  be used by the economic model in the new time period. All of 
this requisite demographic information is available for the countries in our 
representative sample. The demographic model and the necessary accounting is 
given in Schmidt (1979). A summary statement of the labor-force equations 
coming from the demographic model appears in equations (122)-(128) below. 
First, we assume that capitalists are a fixed proportion of the total population, 
N. Thus, 
c = C + C ( - 1 )  ( 122) 
Second, the new stock of skilled labor is simply the old stock, less those lost 
by mortality and/or retirement, plus the (gross) numbers trained last year: 
where ms is the "mortality" rate among the skilled. The unskilled labor force 
is therefore 
i u  = L L li,j,u~i,j,U -[i - m S s ( -  1)1 - k, 
i j 
i = 1, . . . , n age classes I ( 1 2 6 )  j = 1, 2 sex classes 
j = I ,  2 sex classes 
Two other features of the demographic accounting should be noted. First, 
the demographic model also keeps track of the enrollment rates by agesex- 
region and thus the educational attainment levels in the regional labor stocks as 
well. These enrollment rates are exogenous t o  both the economic and d e m e  
graphic models, and are determined by government policy. This manifestation 
of government educational policy is central to  the skills accumulation process 
in our economy described in Section 2.7. Second, the demographic model 
requires information on the age-sex characteristics of the rural-urban 
migration flows. 
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MATHEMATICAL STATEMENT OF CEM 
SUBSCRIPTS 
Sector subscripts (production) 
A : 
H, KS: 
H, RS: 
H, US: 
KS: 
US: 
agriculture 
urban luxury housing; housing stock originally con- 
structed in KS sector 
rural housing; housing stock originally constructed in 
R S  sector 
urban "slum" housing: housing stock originally con- 
structed in US sector 
capital-intensive services (electricity, gas, water, transpor- 
tation and communications, defense, construction of 
urban "luxury" housing stock, education) 
manufacturing (manufacturing and mining) 
rural labor-intensive services (domestics, personal 
services, construction of rural housing stock) 
urban labor-intensive services (domestics, personal 
services, construction of "slum" housing stock) 
Factor subscripts (production) 
K: capital 
L:  unskilled labor 
R :  land 
S :  skilled labor 
2: imported raw materials, including fuel 
Location subscripts 
R :  rural 
U: urban 
Commodity subscripts (demand) 
A : food (A sector) 
C: clothing (M sector) 
D: durables (M sector) 
H: rent (H sector) 
S :  labor-intensive personal services ( R S  or US sector) 
T: transportation and communications ( K S  sector) 
Household subscript (demand) 
C: capitalists and landlords 
KS:  urban "favored" unskilled employed in KS sector 
M: urban "favored" unskilled employed in M sector 
R :  rural unskilled from A and R S  sectors 
S :  skilled from M and KS sectors 
US: urban unskilled employed in US sector 
PARAMETERS 
a i , ~  : 
(Y. . '  
1 . 1 '  
(Yi  : 
coefficient for translating housing stock into "rental 
units" for rural housing 
output elasticity (and cost share) of jth primary input 
in A sector, j = K, L, R 
intercept in the government saving function 
output elasticity (and cost share) of composite of 
primary inputs in the i th sector, i = M, KS (a value- 
added share in gross output) 
output elasticity (and cost share) of Z in the i th sector, 
i = A, M, KS 
output elasticity (and cost share) of jth intermediate 
input in the i th sector, i # j = A, M, KS 
returns to  scale parameter in the informal service sectors, 
i = US, R S  
output elasticity (and cost share) of housing structures 
in urban housing production functions, j = US, KS 
output elasticity (and cost share) of urban land in urban 
housing production function, j = US, KS 
marginal propensity to  save out of government revenue 
(taxes and foreign "aid") 
'Yi, j :  
& H ,  j : 
marginal propensity to  consume the ith commodity 
out of supernumerary income, by the jth household 
type 
marginal cost of training skilled workers of the kth 
(formal) educational attainment 
coefficient measuring the impact of increased urban 
population on government saving 
subsistence bundle, i th commodity, jth household type 
depreciation rate on residential (housing) structures, 
j = US, RS,  KS  
depreciation rate for physical ("productive") capital, 
i = A, M, KS  
elasticity parameter in the net housing investment 
functions 
multiplicative parameter in the net housing investment 
function, j = US, RS,  KS 
fixed "wage-gap" between unskilled labor in M and KS 
relative to  US 
labor force participation rate, i = age, j = sex, k = 
location 
rate of total-factor productivity growth in the jth 
housing sector attributable to  neutral, disembodied, 
sector-specific technological change, j = US, RS, KS 
rate of total-factor productivity growth in the i th  sector 
attributable to  neutral, disembodied, sector-specific 
technological change, i = M, KS, A 
rate of augmentation of physical capital through techno- 
logical change 
rate of augmentation of unskilled labor through techno- 
logical change 
rate of augmentation of skilled labor through techno- 
logical change 
distribution parameter in the ith sector value-added CES 
production function (Qi, ), i = M, KS  
distribution parameter in the ith sector composite capital 
function (&), i = M, KS  
rate of land growth 
elasticity of substitution between "composite capital" 
@ and unskilled labor in the ith sector value-added 
production function (Q,, ), i = M, KS  
elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled 
labor in the ith sector composite capital function ( G i ) ,  
i = M , K S  
sales-tax rate on consumption of M sector goods 
r ~ ,  M : 
r ~ ,  x : 
r y :  
tax (or subsidy) rate on agricultural intermediate inputs 
purchased from manufacturing 
proportional "corporate" profit tax rate in KS "mixed- 
enterprise" sector 
proportional "corporate" profit tax rate in M sector 
urban property tax rate imposed on current value 
according to jth type of residential housing, j = US, KS 
(equivalent) ad valorem tariff rate on M goods imports 
(equivalent) ad valorem tax rate on A goods exports 
proportional income tax rate on property income and 
skilled earnings 
share of urban migrant's income transferred to rural 
households, i = M, US, K S  
share of capitalists and landlords in the total population 
after tax, "corporate" pay-out rate, i = M, KS 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
L : 
m , :  
intercept in the jth housing production function, 
j = US, KS  
intercept in the ith sector's production function, i = 
A, M ,  US, RS,  KS  
number of capitalists and landlords 
nominal value of "foreign aid" and private capital 
inflow 
total unskilled labor stock 
net mortality (and retirement) rate of urban skilled 
workers 
population 
population, i = age, j = sex, k = location 
export price of A goods, f.0.b. 
domestic market price received by producers of A goods 
per unit domestic value-added price of A goods 
world market price of M goods, c.i.f. 
domestic market price received by producers of M goods 
per unit domestic value-added price of M goods 
price per unit of imported raw materials 
total land stock 
augmentation level of physical capital through techno- 
logical change 
augmentation level of skilled labor through technological 
change 
augmentation level of unskilled labor through techno- 
logical change 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
Hj : 
HOUSING: 
i : 
IH, j :  
marginal cost of training per skilled worker 
nominal consumption, jth household 
cost-of-living in the jth household 
nominal rent per hectare of farmland 
nominal rent per hectare of urban land 
nominal rent per hectare of urban land containing jth 
type structure, j = US, KS 
total private consumption demand for A goods 
total rental demand for jth type housing, j = US, RS, KS 
total private consumption demand for KS goods 
total private consumption demand for M goods 
total private consumption demand for RS goods 
total private consumption demand for US goods 
government current expenditures, net of investment 
in training (education) or "productive" capital 
government saving available for training or "productive" 
capital accumulation 
jth type housing stock, j = US, RS, KS 
total gross investment in housing 
economy-wide discount rate 
gross housing investment, jth type housing, j = US, 
RS, KS 
net housing investment in jth type housing j = US, 
RS. KS 
gross sectoral investment, "productive" physical capital, 
i = A, M ,  KS 
total gross investment, "productive" physical capital 
KS outputs purchased for skills investment 
physical (productive) capital in the ith sector, i = A, 
M ,  KS 
unskilled labor in the ith sector, i = A, M ,  US, RS, KS 
unskilled labor in rural area 
unskilled labor in urban area 
potential stock of unskilled urban "trainables" of the 
kth (formal) educational attainment 
net imports of M goods 
nominal rental cost per unit of jth type of housing 
net rent on urban housing units received by owner after 
property tax, j = US, KS 
price of ith commodity paid by jth household 
per unit price of KS output 
per unit value-added price of KS output 
P~~ : 
pus : 
4i : 
4s . j :  
Ru, j :  
RA : 
sj: 
SAVINGS: 
S:  
Si : 
S:  
sj : 
T :  
TRAINING COSTS: 
TR FR : 
TRF,. : 
per unit price of RS output 
per unit price of US output 
"composite capital" in the ith sector, i = M, KS 
anticipated gain in profits due to  investment in skilled 
workers, j = M, KS 
"rental units" produced by the jth type housing stock, 
j = US, RS,  KS  
output of the ith sector, i = A,  M, KS, US, RS  
composite of primary inputs in the ith sector, i = M, KS 
intermediate input of jth good into the ith sector 
profitability index on the jth type of housing, j = US, 
RS, KS  
structure rents on the jth type of housing, j = US, RS,  
KS 
pre-tax returns to  efficiency capital in ith sector, i = A ,  
M, KS  
quasi-rents per unit of efficiency capital in ith sector, 
i = A , M , K S  
pre-tax returns t o  physical capital in ith sector, i = A,  
M, KS 
profitability index on skills investment in the jth industry, 
j = M , K S  
urban land stock for the jth type housing, j = US, KS 
land in farms 
nominal saving, jth household 
total economy-wide savings 
total skilled labor stock 
skilled labor in the ith sector, i = M, KS 
total skilled workers trained 
skilled workers trained in the jth sector 
total government tax revenue 
total costs of training skilled workers 
urban migrants' transfers per rural household 
urban migrant's transfer per unskilled household, i = 
US, M, KS  
urban migrant's transfer per skilled household, i = M, KS 
value of farmland, per hectare 
value of urban residential property per dwelling 
nominal expenditures by jth households on ith com- 
modity. 
efficiency wage, unskilled labor in ith sector 
annual earnings, unskilled labor in ith sector 
efficiency wage, skilled labor in ith sector 
annual earnings, skilled labor in ith sector 
- 
w, : expected urban unskilled earnings facing potential out- 
migrant 
XA : net exports of A goods 
yf : disposable income, jth households 
Zi: raw material (imported) inputs used in the ith sector, 
i = A , M , K S  
PRODUCTION 
oi = A,QZT~*" fl ~ ; i j ,  i = M ,  K S Z j  
j =  A ,  M,KS 
(ai-l)lai + (1 -ti)[zLil (ai-l)/ai ai / (ui- l )  Qi, F = {ti@( 1 
i = M , K S  I (11, (2) 
Qi = Ai[zLi] Oi, 0 < ai < 1, i = US, R S  (4), (5) 
QH, j = A H ~ H , ~ R ~ R , ~  H , i  i , , j ,  f f , j + f f R , j =  1, i = u s , K S  (6) , (7)  
COMMODITY, SERVICE, AND LAND PRICE RELATIONSHIPS 
PM = p z ( 1  + rT,M) (9) 
VH, j = i j = US, KS (i + 7 H . j )  
PRIMARY FACTOR MARKETS 
Labor markets 
Qi G i , L  = Pi' - ( I  - - t i )  
Qi. F ( 1  9 ) ,  ( 2 0 )  
i = M ,  KS,  and where Ph = Ph 
Qi. F 
i = M ,  KS,  and where Ph = ph 
Labor migration 
Capital markets 
Qi f .  = p.' 
Qi, F 
i = M, KS, and where Ph = (3 11, (32) 
Investment allocation 
RETURN DIFFERENTIALS = I [?A - ?$(l - ~ n ,  M)] 1 
MINIMIZE + I [?A -i&(l - T ~ , K S ) ] \  
l i .  M + I[i$(l - T ~ , M ) - ~ ~ s ( ~  -TKI,KS)II 
such that 
I 
where 
Intermediate input markets 
- 
- Qi Pz = Piai ,z -, i = A , M  
Zi 
(361, (37) 
Q K ~  
pz = PKS~KS,  z - 
ZKS 
(38) 
Qi 
PKS = Piai, KS - , i = A , M  
Qi, KS 
(39), (40) 
QKS 
P M  = PKS~KS.M-  
QKS, M 
(41) 
Land markets 
QH* J , j = US, KS d u , ,  = P:,jaR,jp 
Ru, ,  
dA = d u , ,  = d u ,  j = US, K S  ( 4 8 1 ,  ( 4 9 )  
Factor employment 
LU = LM + L K S  + L U S  
L R  = LA + LRS 
L = Lu  + L ,  
S = SM + SKS 
R = Ru,us  + RU,KS + RA 
FOREIGN TRADE SECTOR 
[ P [ M ,  + P z ( z K S  + z M  + Z A ) ]  - [ F ~ X A  + FI = 0 ( 5 5 )  
GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
Government taxes 
T = 7~ [ P M  D M  1 + T H ,  U S  v ~ ,  US Q H ,  U S  + 7 ~ ,  K S  ' H ,  K S  Q H ,  K S  
+ r A , M  [ p M Q A . M l  + 7 Y  [ * M ( 1  - T ~ , M ) ( ~ M  - 6 M p M ) K M  
+ \CIKS ( 1 - 7". K S )  ( r K S  - &KSPM ) K K S  + ' A  K~ + d~ R~ 
+ ( w M , S S M  + w K S , s S K S ) l  + T ~ , M ( ~ M  - 6 M p M ) K M  
+ Tn, K S ( ~ K S  - 6 K S p M ) K K S  + T T ,  M [ P [ ~ M  1 + 7 ~ ,  X [ P A ~ A  1 
Government spending and saving 
Gs = a, + [ T  + FI + Y, I&(- 1 1 1  ( 5 7 )  
GKs  = [ T + F ]  - G s  ( 5 8 )  
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND, SAVING, AND INCOME 
where the commodity index is: 
i = A = food (A sector) 
C clothing ( M  sector) 
D - durables (M sector) 
T - transportation and communications (KS sector) 
S = labor-intensive personal services (RS or US sector) 
H rent (imputed to  housing sectors) 
and the household index is: 
j = R = rural (LA and LRs) households 
US urban unskilled (Lus) households 
M - urban favored unskilled (LM) households 
KS = urban favored unskilled (LKS) households 
S skilled (SM and SKS) households 
C - capitalist and landlord households 
and where household incomes are: 
and where 
C [TRFiPLLi l+  2 [TR&,ssiI 
T R ~ ~  = i = U S , K S , M  i=M.ICS 
L R 
+ pi,  K S  QH,  K S  
C + S  
and households face the following prices: ( 6 2 )  
j = PA for all j 
p . . = p  I . l  M ( ~ + T M )  for all j, i = C, D 
P ~ ,  j = P~~ for all j 
P ~ ,  R = P~~ 
P , j  = Pus for j = US, M, KS, S, C 
j = K S  forj=S,  C 
j = U S  for j = US, M, KS 
R = P ~ , R S  
MIGRANTS' REMITTANCES 
T R 4 ,  L = T ( w ~ ,  L ) ,  i = US, M ,  KS (631465)  
T R F , , ,  = T [ ( l  --ry)wi, S ] ,  i = KS, M (661, ( 6 7 )  
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION DEMAND 
INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS 
Housing in vestment 
IH, RS = Min { S R  L R  P A ,  I:, RS + 6 ~ .  RSHRS J
IH, R~ = Max {O, IH, RS J 
EH I[ RS = OH, RS [ i H ,  RS - I I 
I H , W = M ~ ~ { [ ~ U S L W + ~ M L M + S K S L K S I P ~ A ,  I ~ u s )  
IH, KS = Min {[ssS + sc Cl PA, I:, Ks + 6 ~ .  KSHKS J 
IH, K S  = Max {O, IH, K S  ) (781 
I:, Ks = OH,  Ks [ i H H K S  - 1 I 
j = U S ,  K S ,  R S  (79)-(81) 
r ,  j = 1 , j = US, K S  (82) ,  ( 8 3 )  
Training and skills investment 
o < S < L ~ , ~ ,  k  = 0 ,  Ed > n years 
L U , o < S < ~ I  ,,,, k = l ,  
Lu,.-, <S<Lu,. ,  k = n ,  Ed = 0  
rs,j = C, j = M , K S  ( 9  1 ), ( 9 2 )  
S = C i, < L,, j = M , K S  ( 9 3 )  
i 
where 1 = optimal class trained satisfying ( 9 1 )  and ( 9 2 ) ,  we can define 
TRAINING COSTS = C ck Lu, k + ~1 S  - C Lu, k , k  = 0 ,  . . . , 1 -  1 
k I' 1 ( 9 4 )  
TRAINING COSTS = PKsIs,Ks ( 9 5 )  
Aggregate savings 
SAVINGS = ( 1  - $ , ) [ ( I  - ' T ~ , M ) ( ~ M  - ~ M P M ) K M ]  + ~ M P M K M  
+ ( ~ - $ K s ) [ ( ~ - ~ ~ , K S ) ( ~ X S - ~ K S ~ M ) ~ K S ~ + ~ K S ~ M ~ K S  
+ s ~ ~ L ~ ~  +sMLM +sKSLKS + sRLR + s c C + S S S +  GS 
PM IM = SAVINGS - HOUSING - TRAINING COSTS ( 9 7 )  
MARKET CLEARING 
QM + M M  = DM + I M  + Q A , M  + Q K S , M  ( 9 8 )  
QA = DA + XA + Q M ,  A + QKS, A ( 9 9 )  
GKS QKS = DKS + - + IH, KS + Q M ,  KS + QA, KS + IS, KS (100)  
p~~ 
DYNAMIC EQUATIONS 
Accumulation o f  capital and residential structures 
Ki = ( 1  -&)Ki(-  1 )  + I i v M ( -  l ) ,  i = A ,  M ,  KS (107)4109) 
Land growth and technological progress 
x = x(- l ) e A K  
y = y(- 1 )  eAs 
z = z(- 1 )  eAL 
Ai = A,(- 1 )  e", i = M, KS, A ( 1  161, ( 1  171, ( 1  18) 
AH,, = AH, i(- 1 ) e " ~  j = US, KS (1191, (120) 
R = ( 1  + p)R(- 1 )  (121) 
Labor force growth and skill accumulation 
c = i.+ c(- 1 )  
i. = @,rj 
s = , + + ( I  -rns)S(- 1 )  
L~ = iU + L ~ ( -  1 )  
i i i = 1 ,  . . . , n age classes i j = 1 ,  2 sex classes 
LR = iR + LR( -  1 )  
L R  = 11 l i , j ,Rrji , j ,R> i = 1 ,  . . . , n age classes 
i i  1 = 1 ,  2 sex classes 
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